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LAIMS under both state and federal law often arise out of a
single transaction or series of events. Modern procedural
rules' and jurisdictional provisions usually allow joinder of related
claims in a single proceeding in either federal or state court. Al-
though federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction permits them to adjudicate state
law claims which arise out of the "same nucleus of operative fact"
as a claim falling within federal statutory jurisdiction. A state
court authorized to hear the state law claim will commonly have
concurrent jurisdiction over the federal claim as well.3
This Article examines the effect which state sovereign immu-
nity has on this scheme of concurrent and pendent jurisdiction
when the federal and state claims are against a state or its officials.
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1968, Wesleyan University;
J.D. 1972, University of Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful comments of my
colleagues, Mark Spiegel and George D. Brown, on an earlier draft of this Article and the
research assistance of Frank Noyes, a student in the class of 1986 at Boston College Law
School. I am most indebted to Jennifer A. Coleman, a student in the class of 1985 at Bos-
ton College Law School for her research, criticism, editing, and encouragement.
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and comparable provisions in numerous state
systems patterned after the federal rules, permit joinder of all parties against whom relief is
sought arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences when there are common questions of law or fact. FED. R_ Civ. P. 20(a). A party
asserting a claim for relief may join any other claims against the same defendant. Id. 18(a).
2. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 133-36.
3. A state court of general jurisdiction may, and possibly must, hear claims based on
federal law. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980). State courts of spe-
cialized, or limited, jurisdiction may not be able to adjudicate federal law claims. See infra
note 233. Also, a few federal statutory claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts and may not be determined in state proceedings. See infra note 210.
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In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman4 (Pennhurst I1),
the Supreme Court addressed federalism concerns which arise
when a federal court provides extensive and costly relief, on the
basis of its interpretation of state law, against a state or its offi-
cials. 5 A closely divided Court chose to rely on the eleventh
amendment 6 to justify its decision reversing the lower court or-
ders. It held that the amendment acts as a bar to federal litigation
of state law claims against state officials. In so doing, the Court
created a novel jurisdictional limitation on the federal courts.
The thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court erred in
treating the federalism tension between federal court pendent ju-
risdiction and state sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue an-
swered by the eleventh amendment. The Court extended the
amendment beyond its language, legislative history, and prior con-
struction. It presented an erroneous and unnecessary characteriza-
tion of the eleventh amendment as having "constitutionalized"
state sovereign immunity in an absolute form which compels dis-
missal of all pendent state law claims against a state or its officials.
The Court should instead have resolved the issue in Pennhurst
II on the basis of the federalism principles of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.7 Under the Rules of Decision Act8 and the Erie doc-
4. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
5. "Federalism" refers to the relationship between state and federal governments in
the American constitutional system. It has particular significance in questions of federal
jurisdiction because state courts share with federal courts the power to decide most of the
issues which are raised in federal court. The Supreme Court has described the federalism
principle as "[tihe scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments
which should at all times actuate the federal courts." Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521,
525 (1932).
6. The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of Another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie is one of the most important federalism statements by the
United States Supreme Court. As one commentator observed:
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision. It announces
no technical doctrine of procedure or jurisdiction, but goes to the heart of the
relations between the federal government and the states, and returns to the
states a power that had for nearly a century been exercised by the federal
government.
C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 355 (4th ed. 1983).
8. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
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trine, a federal court adjudicating pendent state law claims is gov-
erned by the immunities and defenses provided by state law." This
permits a court to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it
has evolved in a particular state. It also adequately protects the
state's sovereignty and autonomy by allowing state statutes and
court decisions to determine the scope of immunity.
The approach advocated by this Article, based on Erie, views
state sovereign immunity as a state law defense on the merits.
There was neither need nor justification for the Court to fashion
a jurisdictional restriction in Pennhurst II to protect state sover-
eignty. In exercising its discretion to hear pendent claims, a fed-
eral court considers such factors as judicial economy, convenience,
fairness and avoidance of needless determinations of state law. In
addition, a court can, and should, exercise this discretion in a
manner that is consistent with the sovereign immunity principles
of the state affected. Thus, the federalism concern for protecting
state sovereignty is adequately provided for under the existing
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
The initial section of this Article will review the Pennhurst liti-
gation to illustrate the problem under consideration and to sum-
marize the conflicting views expressed by members of the Court.
The conceptual and practical problems of the Pennhurst II ap-
proach will then be developed in subsequent sections discussing
Erie, state sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment, pen-
dent jurisdiction doctrine, and the consequence of Pennhurst II for
the litigation of concurrent state and federal claims. This analysis
will demonstrate that in Pennhurst II the Court misapplied the
eleventh amendment, overlooked the adequate protection for
state sovereignty provided by state law immunity, and seriously
undervalued the constitutional stature, policy and practical bene-
fits of pendent jurisdiction.
Pennhurst II's ultimate effect is to further complicate what is
already an unduly complex matrix of judicially created limitations
on federal court jurisdiction. It is yet another example in which
the Supreme Court fashions a doctrine of restraint limiting access
to federal courts.' 0 The present interplay of doctrines leads to
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 55-63.
10. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (restrictive application
of federal court "standing" doctrine)- Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454
229
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protracted and tangential litigation regarding the threshold ques-
tion of a court's competence to adjudicate the merits. This com-
plexity defeats what should be a prime purpose of a court sys-
tem-to efficiently resolve disputes on the merits."1
The Pennhurst II decision also increases the pressure on liti-
gants to bring federal claims in state, rather than federal court. As
the concluding portion of this Article develops, it is likely that the
only way a party can obtain rulings on the merits of state and fed-
eral claims is to file both in state court. This diversion of federal
claims away from the federal courts conflicts with congressional
purposes in providing a federal forum for federal question and
civil rights litigation.
I. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
The Pennhurst litigation, regarding conditions at a Pennsylva-
nia institution for the mentally retarded, has a lengthy history
which includes previous consideration by the Supreme Court. The
suit was filed in 1974 on behalf of persons who were, or might
become, residents of the Pennhurst State School and Hospital.
The complaint alleged that conditions at that institution violated
class members' rights under the United States Constitution, 2 two
federal statutes," and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental
U.S. 100 (1981) (comity bars federal court interference in local real estate tax assessment
process); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
(concern for judicial economy justifies stay of federal proceeding in exceptional circum-
stances); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (equitable restraint limits federal interven-
tion in administration of local police department); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(federal court dismissal based on pending state court proceeding in which federal claims
could be raised); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (federal court
abstention to allow state courts to determine state law). See also Fallon, OfJusticiability, Rem-
edies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L, REv. 1
(1984); Newborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirec-
tion, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 545 (1977).
11. See Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 683
(1981).
12. Plaintiffs alleged that conditions at Pennhurst constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the eighth amendment and violated their rights to treatment and
habilitation under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 6, (1981) [hereinafter
referred to as Pennhurst I].
13. The plaintiff asserted violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 409 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), and the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081
230 [Vol. 34
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Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act).14 Plaintiffs sought dam-
ages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,15 against
the hospital and its administrators, the State Department of Public
Welfare, several of its officials, and various county officials respon-
sible for mental retardation services in five Pennsylvania counties
surrounding Pennhurst. Federal jurisdiction over the federal law
claims was premised on the federal question 6 and civil rights stat-
utes,17 with pendent jurisdiction authorizing the federal court to
determine the claim based on the state MH/MR Act.
After a lengthy trial, the federal district court judge found
that conditions at Pennhurst were dangerous and were inadequate
for the habilitation of its residents. He concluded that such condi-
tions violated plaintiffs' rights to "minimally adequate habilita-
(1982).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1982).
15. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
16. Section 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
17. Section 1343 provides:
a. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
1. To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of
the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by an
act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title
42;
2. To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or aid in
preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had
knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
3. To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States;
4. To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to
vote.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
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tion" under the fourteenth amendment and the state MH/MR
Act, to "freedom from harm" under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments and to "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the
equal protection clause and the federal Rehabilitation Act.18 Be-
cause he found that Pennhurst could not provide the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the trial judge or-
dered defendant officials to close the institution and to provide
suitable community living arrangements for class members. He
appointed a special master to supervise and monitor the imple-
mentation of his orders. 19 The trial judge found that defendants
were entitled to immunity on the claim for damages because they
had acted in good faith within the sphere of their official
responsibilities.20
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
lower court, finding that conditions at Pennhurst violated the
plaintiffs' right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting.
2'
However, it narrowed the grounds for liability and the scope of
relief, basing liability solely on the "Bill of Rights" provision of
the federal Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act.22 The court also modified the district court's remedial
order by permitting Pennhurst to remain open for those class
members unable to adjust to life outside of the institution.
23
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and concluded that the federal Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not create any enforceable,
substantive rights.24 The Court found that the provisions in the
18. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314-26 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), modified 662 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
.19. Id. at 1325-26.
20. Id. at 1324. Executive level officials, like the defendants in Pennhurst, are entitled
to qualified immunity in an action for damages under section 1983. See O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court summarized the standard for this quali-
fied immunity stating, "[w]e therefore hold that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.Id. at 818.
21. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 612 F.2d 84, 95-100, 104-07, 114-
15 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
22. Id. at 95-100.
23. Id. at 114.
24. Pennhurst 1, 451 U.S. 1, 5 (1981).
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Act relied upon by the court of appeals were not intended by
Congress to be conditions binding ofi states which receive federal
grants for care of the retarded. 5 The case was remanded to the
court of appeals to determine whether the remedial order could
be supported on the basis of state law, the federal Constitution, or
other federal statutes.26
The court of appeals, on remand, affirmed its prior decision,
this time basing relief solely on the Pennsylvania MH/MR Act. At
this point the eleventh amendment was raised, for the first time,
by defendants as a barrier to consideration of the pendent state
law claim. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's argu-
ment, noting that a federal court may grant prospective injunctive
relief against state officials on the basis of federal claims.28 Judge
Gibbons, writing for the majority en banc concluded that there
was no basis for treating the eleventh amendment restriction on
federal jurisdiction any differently for pendent state law claims
than for federal claims:29 "Since the pendent jurisdiction rule
originated in a case involving state officers, there cannot be, as the
Commonwealth suggests, an eleventh amendment exception to
that rule."30
25. Id. at 22-23.
26. Id. at 31.
27. The defendants had raised an eleventh amendment objection in the initial pro-
ceedings before the district court, but that court only addressed the propriety of the fed-
eral claims against certain defendants. The specific objection to the state law claim was
raised for the first time when the action was remanded to the court of appeals after Pen-
nhurst L Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 656 n.17, rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 900 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as Pennhurst II]. An eleventh amendment objec-
tion may be raised by the parties, or by the court on its own initiative, at any time. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
28. Pennhurst, 673 F.2d 647, 657. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also
infra text accompanying notes 109-18.
29. All eight judges in the en bane consideration agreed with Judge Gibbons' conclu-
sion that the eleventh amendment applies equally to state and federal claims. Pennhurst II,
673 F.2d at 662-63. Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Garth disagreed with the extent of the
relief on federal-state comity grounds. Id. at 662 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting); id. at 663 (Garth,
J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 658. Judge Gibbons noted that the "seminal" case establishing pendent juris-
diction, Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), was decided just one year after
Ex parte Young and had authorized injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of a




In Pennhurst 11,31 a divided Supreme Court again reversed the
court of appeals. A five-Justice majority held that the eleventh
amendment does indeed have very different application to state
law claims than it does to federal claims. Justice Powell's opinion
for the majority concluded that pendent state law claims against
state officials in their official capacities are to be treated as suits
against the state and are barred by the eleventh amendment.
His starting point was to read the eleventh amendment
broadly as incorporating state sovereign immunity doctrine and
federalism principles. The express language of the amendment
did not prohibit the plaintiffs' claim:
The [j]udicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to.
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State. 2
As residents of Pennsylvania, plaintiffs were not "citizens of an-
other state," and the parties sued were state officials, not the state
itself. However, the opinion reflected the view that application of
the amendment should not be limited by its specific wording, since
its "greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental
principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial au-
thority in Art[icle] III." 3 Justice Powell noted the "vital role of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system"34 and
concluded that "in deciding this case we must be guided by '[t]he
principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment
doctrine.' ,,31
Justice Powell concluded that the lower court's order would
effectively "restrain the Government from acting, or compel it to
31. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
32. Id. at 906 (quoting US. CONST. amend. XI).
33. Id. at 906. Justice Powell briefly reviewed decisions of the Court which had ex-
panded construction of the amendment beyond its explicit terms on the basis of this ration-
ale. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), for example, a federal claim against the State
of Louisiana by a citizen of Louisiana was barred by state sovereign immunity as protected
by the eleventh amendment. Prior decisions also had extended the amendment's restriction
to suits against state officials, as well as suits against the state itself, when the relief sought
would in fact operate against the state. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 908.
34. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 907.
35. Id. at 908 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978)).
234 [Vol. 34
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act''36 by operating against the defendants in their official capaci-
ties and therefore was contrary to the sovereign immunity princi-
ples embodied in the eleventh amendment. As presented by the
majority, the state sovereign immunity incorporated in the elev-
enth amendment is absolute. No state law claims may be main-
tained against an unconsenting state or against its officials when
relief runs against the state.3
Justice Powell considered precedent under the eleventh
amendment which established that state sovereignty may yield to
the principle of supremacy of federal law embodied in article VI,
section 2 of the Constitution.3 8 He concluded, however, that the
rationale behind this rule-the protection of federal rights when
they are in conflict with state action-was not applicable to claims
asserting a violation of state, rather than federal law:
A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state
law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme au-
thority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state offi-
cials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts
directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh
Amendment.39
The majority's discussion of sovereign immunity and the dis-
tinction between suits against state officials and those against the
state itself, did not consider Pennsylvania immunity law.40 Al-
36. Id. at 908 n.1 1 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).
37. Id. at 907-09.
38. Article VI provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and All Treaties made, or which shall be made, Under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
Laws of Any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court ruled that the eleventh
amendment does not bar a suit for injunctive relief against a state official to enforce the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. The legal fiction of Young, that a suit against state
officials regarding actions taken within the scope of their offices is not a suit against the
state for eleventh amendment purposes, "has been accepted as necessary to permit the
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to the 'supreme
authority of the United States.'" Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting Young, 209 U.S.
at 160). See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
39. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 911.
40. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished its common law rule of state sover-
eign immunity in Mayle v. Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
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though state law would govern determination of the merits of a
pendent state law claim, Pennhurst II establishes that an absolute
form of sovereign immunity limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts.
Justice Powell recognized that this application of the eleventh
amendment to state law claims created a direct clash with pendent
jurisdiction doctrine and with a series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court had upheld orders against state officials on state
law grounds."' He resolved this conflict on the basis of the relative
stature of each doctrine. He concluded that the express constitu-
tional limitation of the eleventh amendment can not be displaced
by the prudential, judge-made doctrine of pendent jurisdiction:
"[P]endent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the
general language of Art. III. The question presented is whether
this doctrine may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on
federal jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
42
The majority also recognized that its ruling, denying a federal
forum for the pendent claim, would cut against the policies of ju-
dicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants which under-
lie pendent jurisdiction. Pennhurst II will result in the "bifurcation
of claims" between state and federal courts or the litigation of
federal claims in state court.4 3 Justice Powell attempted to mini-
mize the significance of these effects, as "not uncommon in this
area," referring to other eleventh amendment and comity-based
decisions which have relegated litigants to state court.44 He also
noted that concerns for convenience and efficiency must yield to
the constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity: "[S]uch
considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limita-
The state legislature responded by passing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (Purdon 1983),
which re-established sovereign immunity, subject to specific statutory exceptions such as 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (Purdon 1983), which permits liability in a variety of negli-
gence actions. The only reference made by the United States Supreme Court to Pennsylva-
nia immunity law was on the question of waiver by the commonwealth of its eleventh
amendment protection. Pennsylvania's statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity ex-
pressly state that they do not constitute a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity from
suit in federal court. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 909 n.12.
41. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 917.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 919-20.
44. Id. at 920. Justice Powell relied on Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. Mc-
Nary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), in making these
assertions.
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tion on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits
against a State. . . .8F That a litigant's choice of forum is re-
duced 'has long been understood to be a part of the tension inher-
ent in our system of federalism.'""
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the ma-
jority that the eleventh amendment embodies the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 4 He disagreed, however, with
the majority's application of sovereign immunity principles to suits
against state officials. By tracing the development of sovereign im-
munity doctrine both in England and in America, Justice Stevens
concluded that at the time the eleventh amendment was ratified,
it was well established that suits were permitted against officials
acting ultra vires. In such cases, the action was deemed to be
against the agent who was acting unlawfully, not against the state
itself.
47
Justice Stevens disputed the majority's contention that sover-
eign immunity principles only yield when they are in conflict with
federal law. In his opinion, state officials who act contrary to state
law cannot avail themselves of sovereign immunity. He concluded
that the failure of the defendants in Pennhurst II to comply with
the Pennsylvania MH/MR Act established the ultra vires nature of
their actions and thus their accountability under state law. 8
Justice Stevens was particularly caustic in stating his disagree-
ment with the majority's treatment of pendent jurisdiction prece-
dent. He accused the majority of repudiating at least twenty-eight
of its prior decisions in a "voyage into the sea of undisciplined
lawmaking. ' "He asserted that the Court's earlier pendent juris-
diction decisions, granting prospective relief against state officials
on state law grounds, had expressly settled the issue which the ma-
jority chose to treat as open:
None of these cases contain only "implicit" or sub silentio holdings; all of
them explicitly consider and reject the claim that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctive relief based on state law.
There is therefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue
45. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 920 (quoting Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health & Wel-
fare Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
46. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 924, 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 922-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 932-39.
49. Id. at 944.
1985] 237
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presented by this case is an open one... 80
Justice Stevens' proposed method of analysis would require a
federal court to determine whether the federal claim supporting
federal jurisdiction is barred by the eleventh amendment. If it is
barred, no state law claim can be heard as pendent to it. However,
if the federal claim is not prohibited by the amendment, the fed-
eral court has pendent jurisdiction to provide the same relief
under state law as it could under federal law. 51 Not only could the
federal court award prospective relief on state law grounds, but
well-established prudential considerations guiding federal courts
would usually require that the state law claim be considered first
and that the federal claim not be reached unless state law fails to
provide a remedy.52
Justice Brennan's separate dissenting opinion staked out a dis-
tinct position regarding the relationship between common law
sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment. He disagreed
with the views of both Justice Powell and Justice Stevens that the
eleventh amendment embodies sovereign immunity doctrine as a
constitutional, jurisdictional limitation on federal courts. He reit-
erated his view that the amendment should be applied as a juris-
dictional limitation only to the extent of its express lan-
guage-barring suits against a state by citizens of another state.5 3
A state would not have a constitutional immunity from suits
brought by its own citizens, but would have a defense based on
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. He concluded:
"To the extent that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity
may apply to petitioners, I agree with Justice Stevens that since
petitioners' conduct was prohibited by state law, the protections of
sovereign immunity do not extend to them. 54
50. Id. at 928.
51. Justice Stevens would apply the same eleventh amendment limitation on relief
under a state law claim as applies to a federal law claim. Pennhurst II, 104 S.Ct. at 924-29
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
52. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 939-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Justice Brennan first elaborated this theory of the relationship between sovereign
immunity and the eleventh amendment in his dissenting opinion in Employees v. Missouri
Pub. Health & Welfare Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 922 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 34238
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II. SUMMARY OF THESIS AND A BRIEF DIGRESSION ON Erie
There are both conceptual and practical problems with the
Pennhurst II decision. The decision perpetuates an erroneous
characterization of the eleventh amendment, maintaining that it
establishes sovereign immunity as an absolute jurisdictional bar-
rier to suits against state officials in federal court.55 The amend-
ment should instead be seen as creating a narrow jurisdictional
limitation, prohibiting only suits against a state by citizens of an-
other state. This interpretation leaves common law state sovereign
immunity intact as a defense on the merits to other suits against a
state. The distinction is not particularly significant when the
amendment is applied to federal claims against a state or its offi-
cials. In such actions, federal common law immunity would govern
and would lead to the same result, whether characterized as juris-
dictional or as a defense on the merits.
56
However, the distinction between sovereign immunity as a ju-
risdictional objection and as a defense on the merits is crucial in
the consideration of pendent state law claims. If the immunity is
absolute and is jurisdictional, then a federal court may not hear a
state claim against a state or against its officials. However, if sover-
eign immunity is characterized as a defense on the merits, then a
federal court may have pendent jurisdiction over the state law
claim and would determine it on the basis of state law.57 Unlike
55. See, e.g.., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); Exparte New York,
256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
56. If sovereign immunity is treated as a jurisdictional bar, a suit in federal court
would be dismissed at the onset. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Similarly, if common law provides
an absolute immunity for a defendant, the court will dismiss at the pleading stage for fail-
ure to state a claim. Id. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has utilized federal common law
immunity principles as a complete defense on the merits in section 1983 claims against
state judges and state legislators. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 351 U.S. 367 (1951). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at § 60.
57. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), where the Court quoted
Erie in discussing the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction:
It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judi-
cial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a
federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even
though bound to apply state law to them, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.
Id. at 726 (emphasis added). See also, 1A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.305[3]
(2d ed. 1983); C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at § 19; Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amend-
ment and The Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984). Federal courts are required
by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), to apply state law to claims arising
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federal question cases, in which the federal courts apply a federal
doctrine of state sovereign immunity, state law claims against ei-
ther a state or state officials should be decided on the basis of state
immunity principles. Under this approach, the issue in Pennhurst
II should have been addressed as a question of state law: whether
the defendant officials were immune under Pennsylvania law from
suits for injunctive relief regarding their operation of Pennhurst
State Hospital.
The federalism principles established in Erie provide a better
means of protecting state sovereignty than an over-extended and
tortured application of the eleventh amendment. The application
of state law immunity doctrine to pendent state claims will fully
protect a state's self-defined interest in preserving its sovereignty.
The Supreme Court's decision in Erie established that a fed-
eral court adjudicating claims based on state law should apply the
decisional law of that state. Prior to 1938, federal courts were re-
quired to follow the statutory law of the state, but were allowed to
make their own determinations regarding common law matters.
Justice Brandeis concluded in Erie that this role, which federal
courts had assumed under Swift v. Tyson, 58 derogated the sover-
eignty retained by the states in our federal system. His opinion
presented a view of federal-state relations which recognized the
autonomy of states to determine, whether by statute or by court
decision, the substantive rules governing the day-to-day conduct
of its citizens. The diversity jurisdiction provisions which permit
federal courts to hear certain state law claims were designed to
provide out-of-state litigants with a neutral forum. They did not
authorize federal courts to develop a body of law separate from
that of the state courts.59
The Erie decision also reflected a significant change in juris-
prudential thinking about the common law adjudication process
itself. The traditional view that judges were "finding" the law
under state causes of action. See supra note 8. Erie construed the Rules of Decision Act as
requiring federal courts to apply both state statutory and decisional law in such cases.
58. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 15 (1842) (interpreting section 34 of the judiciary Act, popu-
larly known as The Rules of Decision Act (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
59. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-78. The broader federalism implications of Erie, beyond the
diversity jurisdiction context, have been explored in a variety of articles and books. See,
e.g., T. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWift & Erie CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
155-64 (1981); Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the
Nature and Role of Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617 (1984).
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yielded to the legal realist's observation that judges were "mak-
ing" the law.60 During the 1800s, judges did not distinguish be-
tween "state" common law and "federal" common law. Judges,
both state and federal, were engaged in an enterprise of discover-
ing the best rules for governing human activities. Differences be-
tween court systems in the rules they applied, were seen as tempo-
rary discrepancies which would be resolved as part of the
evolutionary process of the common law.61
Thus, when the eleventh amendment was enacted in 1795,
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was viewed as a
body of principles equally applicable to state and federal govern-
ments. When a federal court had jurisdiction to hear claims
against a state based on state law, it would not defer to state court
decisions regarding the common law immunity of that state. The
federal court would itself develop the appropriate scope of sover-
eign immunity available to the state.
By 1938, however, a very different view of the common law
process had emerged. In their common law decisions, judges were
seen as creating law for that particular jurisdiction, much as legis-
latures create law by passing statutes. Common law rules not only
differed between states, but also between state and federal courts
sitting in the same state. Variations between states were not prob-
lematic, since each was sovereign within its own boundaries. Dis-
crepancies between state rules and those applied by federal courts
created intolerable problems, however, because of the dual sover-
eignty within our federal system. Erie clarified that confusion,
holding that the overlapping jurisdiction of the state and federal
courts did not alter the intent of the framers that states were to
remain sovereign in all matters not delegated to the federal
government.2
Since the Erie decision, a federal court hearing a claim based
on state law must follow that state's common law rules. Thus, had
the Supreme Court not applied the eleventh amendment as a ju-
risdictional bar in Pennhurst II, the Pennsylvania common law and
statutory principles of sovereign immunity would have gov-
60. "The notion that decisions of a court are not 'laws' was ridiculed by a new genera-
tion, which was prepared to accept the idea that judges do not merely find the law but in
fact make it." C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at § 54.
61. Swift, 41 U.S. at 11.
62. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
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erned.6 5 The defendant officials would have had a good defense
on the merits to the extent that Pennsylvania law protected them
from injunctive relief and damages. If Pennsylvania had chosen
not to protect its officials from suit or had waived its sovereign
immunity, liability could be found under state law.
The next section of this Article will review the Court's fluctu-
ating and often conflicting construction of the eleventh amend-
ment in light of this thesis. It is followed by a summary of the
development of pendent jurisdiction, which concludes that the
constitutional stature and significant practical benefits of that doc-
trine were underestimated by the Pennhurst II decision. As will be
shown, a discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction is suffi-
ciently protective of state sovereignty. It was unnecessary for the
court to fashion a novel construction of the eleventh amendment
to bar all pendent state claims against the state or its officials.
The concluding section of this Article will consider the practi-
cal consequences of the Pennhurst II ruling for the litigation of
concurrent state and federal claims. It will demonstrate that the
construction of the amendment adopted in Pennhurst II is not only
unjustified and unnecessary, but also unwise. It further compli-
cates the principles governing federal jurisdiction in ways which
will increase the judicial resources spent considering jurisdictional
issues, and it effectively denies a federal forum to litigants with
concurrent state and federal claims.
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The majority in Pennhurst II did not rely on the express lan-
guage or the legislative history of the eleventh amendment in
reaching its conclusion that the pendent state claim was barred.
For nearly one hundred years the Court has used the eleventh
amendment as a broad mandate to fashion a doctrine of state sov-
ereign immunity which fulfills the federalism scheme of the Con-
stitution.64 This has resulted in applications of the amendment
63. Professor Shapiro reached the same conclusion regarding the applicability of
Pennsylvania sovereign immunity law. He concluded that there was no Pennsylvania doc-
trine of sovereign immunity that could possibly apply to the case. See Shapiro, supra note
57, at 78 n.107.
64. In Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), for example, the Court relied upon
notions of state sovereignty which underlie the eleventh amendment in ruling that the
amendment barred suits against states by foreign nations, even though such are not within
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which are sometimes broader, 5 and other times narrower," than
its literal language. In its decisions, the Court has been struggling
with a basic tension in our federalism-how much sovereignty do
the states retain when they have entered into a federal system
which establishes restrictions on permissible state conduct?
The original Constitution set few substantive limits on state
action.6 7 Initial application of the eleventh amendment established
it as an absolute, jurisdictional bar to suits within its express prohi-
bition. After the Civil War, however, the scope of the amendment
and the balance between state sovereignty and the supremacy of
federal law had to be reconsidered in light of the massive realign-
ment of federal-state relations effected by the thirteenth," four-
the express prohibition of the amendment. "Manifestly, we cannot . . . assume that the
letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-con-
senting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit
and control." Id. at 322. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) the Court referred to
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Id. at 691.
Professors Hart and Sachs present the prevalent view that the eleventh amendment was a
narrowly framed provision which invited judicial elaboration of its underlying "postulates."
2 H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 807
(1958). The federalism basis for the Court's application of the eleventh amendment is dis-
cussed in Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 CoLo. L. REV. 139, 172-88
(1977) ("Considerations of federalism seem to underlie all aspects of the eleventh amend-
ment."); see also Nowak, The Scope Of Congressional Power To Create Causes Of Action Against
State Governments And The History Of The Eleventh And Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1441 (1975) ("[A]ny case involving the Eleventh Amendment raises an intensely
practical problem inherent in the concept of federalism."); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REv. 513, 520-26 (1983) ("The Courts treat the Eleventh
Amendment as a tool of federalism.").
65. Although the literal language of the amendment would not seem to reach such
suits, the Court has relied on it to prohibit suits against a state by a foreign country, Mon-
aco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); admiralty actions involving a state, Ex parte New
York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921); and suits by citizens against their home states, Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See Baker, supra note 63, at 147-53.
66. The Court has permitted suits which would fall within the express limitations of
the amendment on the basis of a state's "consent" to suit. See, e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U.S. 18, 20 (1933); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906). Also,
Congress has authority to abrogate the limitation of judicial power. See Fitzpatrick v.
Blitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
67. Article I, section 10 is one of the few sections of the original Constitution which
established express limitations on state action. US. CONST. art. I, § 10. It prohibits states
from, inter alia, entering into treaties, coining money, passing bills of attainder, passing ex
post facto laws or passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
68. The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
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teenth,69 and fifteenth amendments.7 0 Those amendments, along
with the civil rights and jurisdictional legislation enacted in the
1860s and 1870s, vastly expanded the substantive restrictions on
the states and created new bases of federal court jurisdiction for
the enforcement of those restrictions.
7 1
The Supreme Court, in its decisions reconciling state sover-
eignty and the mandates of federal law, has functioned as a com-
mon law court, striking what it considers to be an appropriate bal-
ance in light of the political philosophies and practical realities of
the day.72 Unfortunately, the Court has not candidly admitted to
what it is doing. It purports to apply an absolute form of immu-
nity, which has no analogue in either state or federal common
law, as a jurisdictional limitation on the federal courts. It is actu-
ally balancing state sovereign immunity against the substantive
federal right being litigated. The Court's eleventh amendment de-
cisions reflect the relative importance placed on state sovereignty
and the federal rights at issue.73 In this sense, they are more accu-
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
69. The fourteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONS-n amend. XIV.
70. The fifteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. The Right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
71. See, e.g.., Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335; Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat.
13. Act of March 5, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (federal question jurisdiction); Civil Rights Act of
1870, 16 Stat. 140; Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. These statutes have been codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
72. See Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of
Judicial Power, 1983 U.IL. L.F. 423.
73. See C. JACOBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 122-25 (1972);
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rately characterized as rulings on the merits than as elaboration of
a consistent principle of federal court jurisdiction.
A. Historical Context and Initial Construction of the Eleventh
Amendment"'
In its absolute, historical form in English common law, sover-
eign immunity barred any action against the King in his own
courts .7  At the time the Constitution was ratified, the American
colonial governments had by charter or by court decision adopted
some form of sovereign immunity from suit.7 6 However, by the
late 1700s in both England and the colonies, sovereign immunity
was by no means absolute. Suits were routinely permitted against
state officials as a means of testing the legality of the official's ac-
tion on behalf of the sovereign.7 7 As Justice Stevens noted in his
Pennhurst 11 dissent, the common law mitigated the unfairness of
an absolute immunity doctrine by distinguishing between the sov-
ereign itself and officials who were allegedly acting ultra vires.7 8
The original Constitution did not expressly adopt or abrogate
the common law immunity of states. Article 11 9 created federal
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U.PA. L.
REV. 515, 526 (1978).
74. Several articles review in detail the passage of the amendment, its relationship to
common law sovereign immunity and its early interpretations. See C. JACOBS, supra note 73;
M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
(1980); Baker, supra note 64; Field, supra note 72; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983);
Nowak, supra note 64; Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regu-
lation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682
(1976).
75. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting). C. JACOBS, supra note 73, at
5; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 254-55. See also id. at 241-44.
76. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1979); C. JACOBS, supra note 73, at 6-8;
M. REDISH, supra note 74, at 139. But see Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1895-99 (concluding
that state sovereign immunity was not the general rule at the time the Constitution was
ratified).
77. "The distinction between an officer of the government and the government itself
in Sovereign immunity cases was, if anything, better established in the early nineteenth
century than it is today." Fletcher, supra note 74, at 1085 n.212.
78. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 931 n.21 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
79. Article III provides:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
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jurisdiction for the Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as
Congress might create, in two categories of cases: (1) those in-
volving certain subject matter, such as federal questions and admi-
ralty matters; and (2) party-based jurisdiction which rests on the
citizenship or official position of the parties.80 In the ratification
debates, some argued that the jurisdictional grant for suits "be-
tween a state and Citizens of Another State" could be construed
to permit individual suits against a state, contrary to the existing
common law immunity. 81 Delegates from at least four state con-
ventions asked that the article be amended to clarify that it was
not intended to condone such suits.8 2 It was passed without
amendment, however, at least in part due to the assurances of
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall that arti-
cle III only authorized suits by a state as plaintiff and should not
be construed to alter a state's immunity. 8
3
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which, shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
80. The subject matter jurisdictional provisions make no reference to states as parties;
the party-based provisions mention states as parties in establishing jurisdiction over contro-
versies "between two or more States;" "between a State and Citizens of another State;"
and "between a State ... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id.
81. See C. JACOBS, supra note 73, at 40; Baker, supra note 64, at 141; Field, supra note
73, at 529-31: Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1902-14.
82. Baker, supra note 64, at 141 n.10.
83. Statements made by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall in
the Federalist Papers and state ratification conventions appear to support the retention of
state immunity from suit despite language in article III extending federal judicial power to
controversies between states and citizens of another state. See M. REDISH, supra note 74, at
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Nothing in the debates, however, suggests that article III was
intended to affirmatively establish sovereign immunity as a consti-
tutional principle. Recent scholarship affirms this reading of arti-
cle III's history-that it was intended to leave untouched the pre-
existing common law immunity of the states .
4
In Chisholm v. Georgia,8 5 the Supreme Court attempted to re-
solve this ambiguity. The Court permitted citizens of South Caro-
lina, executors of a British creditor, to bring an original action in
the Supreme Court to collect a debt from the State of Georgia.
The suit would have been barred under common law immunity
principles since it was a suit expressly against the sovereign. How-
ever, the Court held the defense of sovereign immunity was un-
available because Georgia had impliedly waived some aspects of its
sovereignty upon entering the federal union. They interpreted
the language in article III as abrogating common law immunity
and authorizing suits against a state in federal court.
The eleventh amendment was swiftly proposed and ratified in
order to reverse the Chisholm decision. 8 There was widespread
support for the amendment, not necessarily because it reflected
better than Chisholm the original intention of article III, but be-
cause of the fear of financial and political consequences that
would result if states could be held accountable for their revolu-
tionary war debts.87
139; Baker, supra note 64, at 140-41; Field, supra note 73, at 527-29.
84. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 73, at 27-40; Field, supra note 73, at 536-46;
Fletcher, supra note 74, at 1045-54; Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1899-920; Shapiro, supra
note 57, at 67-68.
85. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
86. President Adams declared the amendment to be part of the Constitution on Janu-
ary 8, 1798, in a message to Congress. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 482, 809 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
Ratification by three-quarters of the states occurred on February 7, 1795, when the
amendment was approved by North Carolina. U.S.CA CONsT. amend. XI hist. note (1972).
87. An article appearing in the Independent Chronicle, July 25, 1793 stated:
"[N]umerous prosecutions that will immediately issue from the serious claims of refugees,
Tories, etc. that will introduce such a series of litigation as will throw every state in the
Union into the greatest confusion." (Quoted in 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 (rev. ed. 1947)).
Justice Marshall presented this view of the motivating force behind the amendment in
Cohen v. Virginia, 6 U.S. (I Wheat.) 264, 406, 407 (1821). See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53 (2d. ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as J.
NOWAK]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 3-35 (1978); Baker, supra note 64, at
145-46; Fletcher, supra note 73, at 1050. But ef. C. JACOBS, supra note 73, at 4, 69-70, 91
(support for argument that the amendment was a broader recognition of the inherent sov-
ereignty of the states and their immunity from compulsory appearances before tribunals of
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The absence of legislative history and serious debate regard-
ing the eleventh amendment's passage,"" has provoked considera-
ble disagreement within the Court, as well as among commenta-
tors, about the amendment's proper scope. A review of the
alternative formulations of the amendment considered by Con-
gress indicates that it was not intended to be a broad prohibition
of federal jurisdiction, but a narrow overruling of the construc-
tion of article III that had been adopted in Chisholm.
The initial version of the amendment, proposed in the House
of Representatives just one day after the Chisholm decision, would
have established the broad principle that an individual may not
sue a state as a party defendant in any federal court."9 The follow-
ing day, a second amendment was filed in the House which pro-
posed a much more specific overturning of Chisholm: "The Judi-
cial power of the United States shall not extend to any suits in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign state." 90
Neither of these proposals were acted upon by Congress. The
second version, however, was introduced again in both the House
and Senate the following year, with one alteration: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State."91 The amendment was passed in that
form by Congress in January, 1794 and ratified by three-quarters
another sovereign). See generally Nowak, supra note 64, at 1436-41.
88. It is not known who drafted the amendment and there are no committee reports
nor discussions in Congress to guide in its interpretation. Both of the dominant political
parties at the time, the Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists, supported the amend-
ment. Nowak, supra note 64, at 1436-41.
89. The initial version provided:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial
courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the
United States, at the suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens,
or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or corporate, whether within
or without the United States.
Pa.J. & Weekly Advertisers, Feb. 27, 1793, at 1, col.2, reprinted in Fletcher, supra note 74,
at 1059 n.116. This proposed amendment reflected the sentiment held by many state offi-
cials that Chisholm should be reversed by establishing a blanket immunity from suit in fed-
eral court. C. WARREN, supra note 87, at 100.
90. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793).
91. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794) (emphasis added).
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of the states in 1795.
Had the framers of the eleventh amendment intended to es-
tablish a constitutional principle of absolute state sovereign immu-
nity, they would not have adopted the third version submitted to
Congress. The first proposal would have expressly created such a
blanket barrier. The language of the amendment as enacted was
more carefully drafted to effect only a reversal of Chisholm's con-
struction of article III, and it does no more than that. It clarifies
that "The Judicial power of the United States," the same phrase
used in article III, is not to be construed, as the Supreme Court
had in Chisholm, to extend to suits against a state by citizens of
another state.92
The Supreme Court's initial application of the amendment
followed the express language and contained no hint of the
broader doctrine which was to develop after the Civil War. Its lit-
eral application provided protection for state treasuries-the goal
of the amendment. Prior to the Civil War, there was no original
jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear federal question suits
against a state by citizens of that same state.93 Strict construction
of the amendment was thus sufficient to bar the bulk of cases
which might be brought against a state.
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide disputes be-
tween a state and citizens of the same state in reviewing admiralty
decisions of the lower federal courts and rulings on federal ques-
tions by the state courts. The implication of the Supreme Court's
decisions in those cases was that the eleventh amendment did not
apply to suits against a state by citizens of the same state.94
Thus, prior to the Civil War, the Court's application of the
eleventh amendment was consistent with its express language and
.with its historical context-it was seen as narrowing the construc-
92. The amendment goes slightly further than reversing the Chisholm decision in its
prohibition of suits by citizens of a foreign state. This phrase was presumably added to
clarify the provision in article III that the judicial power shall extend to controversies "be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. This addition is still consistent with the thesis that the amendment was in-
tended to clarify the construction of article III and not as a broad incorporation of an
absolute immunity for states as defendants.
93. There was a federal question statute in the early 1800's which was quickly re-
pealed. Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 9,
2 Stat. 132.
94. See Fletcher, supra note 74, at 1078-87; Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1941-68.
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tion of the party-based jurisdictional provisions of article III.
B. Post Civil War
The economic conditions of the 1790s which led to passage of
the eleventh amendment were again prevalent in many of the
Southern states after the Civil War. Several states passed legisla-
tion repudiating public bonds,9 raising an apparent conflict with
the contract clause of article I, section 10.' 8 Because of changes in
the jurisdiction of the federal courts the Supreme Court devel-
oped a more expansive reading of the amendment in order to
protect Southern state treasuries from suits to collect public debts.
The express language of the amendment was unhelpful because
after passage of the "federal question" jurisdictional statute in
1875, 97 suit could be brought in federal court against a repudiat-
ing state by one of its own citizens, on a claim that the state was
violating the federal Constitution. Furthermore, several of the
suits which reached the Court were brought against state officials,
not the state itself, to avoid the restrictions of the eleventh
amendment.
The Supreme Court apparently did not want to require offi-
cials to make payments from the state treasuries. Such relief was
viewed as contrary to the spirit and historical genesis of the elev-
enth amendment. It was quite probably unenforceable as well. By
1877, Congress and the Executive branch were relinquishing fed-
eral oversight of Southern state governments which they had un-
dertaken during Reconstruction. They were unlikely to come to
the aid of the Supreme Court if it attempted to compel payments
by resisting states.98
The Court's decisions denying recovery against the Southern
states were premised on state sovereign immunity, but were am-
biguous as to the relationship between that immunity and the
eleventh amendment. For example, in Hans v. Louisiana," a fed-
eral question suit against the State of Louisiana was dismissed on
95. Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1973-78.
96. Article 1, section 10 provides: "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto law, or law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobil-
ity." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
97. Act of March 5, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)),
98. Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1982-2002; Orth, supra note 72, at 433-35.
99. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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sovereign immunity grounds. The Court's opinion did not clarify
whether the suit was barred by a broad construction of the elev-
enth amendment which incorporated sovereign immunity, or by
general common law immunity principles.100
The Supreme Court has cited Hans in subsequent cases as the
source of its broad construction of the eleventh amendment.101
Eight of the Justices in Pennhurst I112 accepted this view-that
the amendment and the reversal of Chisholm reinstated the so-
called "original understanding"103 of article III that unconsenting
states have an absolute immunity from suit. State sovereignty is
thus seen to be incorporated as a constitutional restriction of fed-
eral court jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's reading of Hans, persuasively supported by
several recent historical studies, is that the incorporation of broad
immunity principles into the eleventh amendment was neither in-
tended nor necessary to protect state sovereignty in federal ques-
tion suits.104 Justice Brennan's interpretation of the amendment is
more consistent with its historical context and its initial construc-
tion. The reversal of Chisholm merely established that article III
did not abrogate common law sovereign immunity; it did not dic-
tate the further proposition that article III was intended to im-
pose a constitutional immunity. The amendment, under this ap-
proach, is seen as restoring the original neutrality of article III
toward sovereign immunity and as leaving the common law de-
fense available as a non-constitutional, non-jurisdictional protec-
tion for state autonomy.
10 5
100. See Field, supra note 73, at 537 n.81.
101. See, e.g., Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 906-07; Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 450 U.S. 670, 683 n.17 (1982).
102. This was the position adopted by the five Justices joining in the Pennhurst II ma-
jority opinion, Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 906-07, as well as by dissenting Justices Stevens,
Marshall and Blackmun, id. at 929.
103. Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 292 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also C. JACOBS, supra note 73; M. REDISH,
supra note 74, at 144; Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV. 1
(1967); Field, supra, note 73; Fletcher, supra note 74; Gibbons, supra note 74; Thornton,
The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293 (1980).
105. This is basically the approach of Justice Brennan. See Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at
921-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Cullison, supra note 104; Field, supra note 73;
Gibbons, supra note 74; Thornton, supra note 104.
2511985]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
A common law application of immunity could have been em-
ployed to protect Southern state treasuries in cases similar to
Hans. In other instances, the Supreme Court has denied recovery
against government officials on the basis of common law immuni-
ties which are not incorporated in the Constitution.0 0
Why, then, did the Court in Hans and subsequent decisions
craft this particular immunity as a constitutional one? A possible
explanation is that the Court was more comfortable premising its
ruling on its lack of jurisdiction than it was deciding that the state
had an immunity defense on the merits. By incorporating sover-
eign immunity doctrine into the eleventh amendment's limitation
on federal judicial power, the Court was able to avoid all discus-
sion of the merits. It was thus able to avoid the troublesome issue
of resolving the conflict between a constitutional requirement, the
contract clause, and a common law doctrine of immunity. 07
The Court also had to manipulate its doctrine regarding suits
against state officials in order to protect the Southern state trea-
suries. There had previously been a clear distinction between suits
against officials who were acting illegally and suits against the state
itself. In a series of decisions, the Court shifted the focus away
from the nominal defendant to the relief being sought and barred
suits against state officials when the remedy would run against the
sovereign.108
106. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (state judges absolutely immune
from federal civil liability because of common law immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 351
U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators absolutely immune from liability under section 1983
based on common law immunity).
107. To have ruled in favor of the defendant states on the merits, the Hans Court
would have had to either hold that the contract clause was not violated by the states' repu-
diation of bonds-a deviation from their previous construction of that provision-or hold
that this express constitutional restriction on the states was limited by non-constitutional,
common law immunity principles.
Another possible explanation for "constitutionalizing" its ruling is that the Court
wished to place it beyond the review of Congress. If state sovereignty in federal question
cases was protected only by common law principles, it could be modified or abolished
through legislation. In 1890, there was no immediate basis for concern that Congress
would legislatively curb state sovereignty. By the 1920's and 1930's, however, the Court
was embroiled in conflicts with Congress. These conflicts may have made the Court much
more sensitive to the possibility of Congressional reversal of its decisions. This might ex-
plain why it was the Court's subsequent decisions, in the 1920's and 1930's, and not the
Hans decision itself which expressly established the constitutional basis for sovereign immu-
nity. See, e.g.., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); and Ex parte New York, 256
U.S. 490 (1921).
108. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769 (1882);
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While these expansive interpretations of the eleventh amend-
ment accomplished the Court's aims in the Southern debt cases,
they went too far in insulating state activities in other areas. The
Court quickly cut back on the broad construction of the eleventh
amendment in order to preserve a role for federal courts in en-
forcing the Constitution.
C. Ex Parte Young'0 9
In matters affecting the national economy, the Supreme
Court of the late 1800s and early 1900s wished to restrict state
interference with interstate commerce. If an absolute form of sov-
ereign immunity were incorporated as a jurisdictional limitation,
the states would effectively be beyond the control of the Supreme
Court and the Constitution. Suits against a state or its officials re-
quiring them to comply with the Constitution could only be
brought in state court, immune even from Supreme Court appel-
late review." 0 If the Court was to utilize substantive due process
to invalidate state legislation, there had to be some limitation es-
tablished on the immunity of states."' The Court accomplished
that in Ex parte Young, by permitting the plaintiff to bring a suit
against a state official even though the relief requested clearly op-
erated against the state and not the individual official.
In Ex parte Young railroad stockholders sought to enjoin state
officials from implementing a rate structure that they alleged was
unfair, confiscatory, and violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment."' The Supreme Court upheld the juris-
diction of the lower court which had issued an injunction against
Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, prohibiting him from
enforcing the penalty provisions of the rate statute. The Court
reasoned that the attorney general was separate from the state for
eleventh amendment purposes:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
Louisiana v. Gumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
109. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
110. As a limitation on the construction of article III, the eleventh amendment re-
stricts the original jurisdiction of the district courts as well as the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.
111. See Orth, supra note 72, at 453-55.
112. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 143-45.
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of the complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which
does not affect, the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is sim-
ply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of
the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void be-
cause unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to
enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding
under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subject in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct.113
Thus, the Attorney General of Minnesota was considered to be
acting on behalf of the state for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, which only restricts "state action," but was not acting
on behalf of the state for eleventh amendment purposes, which
prohibits suit against a state.""4 The "wedge" between the official
and the state was the allegation of illegal conduct on the part of
the official. The sovereign could not authorize illegal or unconsti-
tutional actions, and thus the official was acting without authority
of the sovereign.
In Pennhurst II, Justice Powell read Ex parte Young as a feder-
alism decision which reconciled the conflict between state sover-
eignty and the supremacy of federal law. 16 The fictional distinc-
tion between the Attorney General and the State of Minnesota
was necessary to justify an intrusion into the state's autonomy in
order to vindicate federal law. Because the state law claim in Pen-
nhurst II involved no conflict between state sovereignty and fed-
eral law, he saw no basis for transporting the Ex parte Young fic-
tion to Pennhurst H. 6
Justice Stevens, however, regarded Ex parte Young as a sover-
eign immunity case calling for application of the well-settled con-
cept that an official acting illegally can not be acting for the sover-
eign. 11 7 For Stevens, the significance of Ex parte Young is that
because of the supremacy clause, federal law can render officials'
actions ultra vires, even though state law would appear to author-
ize their conduct. Injustice Stevens' opinion, that decision did not
hinge on the federal nature of the claim, but rather on the asser-
113. Id. at 159-60.
114. Id. at 160; see also Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 910.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
116. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 910-11.
117. Id. at 932-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tion that the official was acting illegally, under either state or fed-
eral law. The justification for the fiction is not the supremacy of
federal law, but the amelioration of what would otherwise be an
absolute immunity of all persons claiming to act on behalf of the
sovereign.""'
The majority's conclusion in Pennhurst II was that the elev-
enth amendment incorporates an absolute immunity both for
states and for state officials when the relief sought would operate
against the state. This immunity only yields under the supremacy
clause and the Ex parte Young rationale, when it is in conflict with
a principle of comparable constitutional stature, such as the four-
teenth amendment."1 9 The Stevens' dissent argued that the elev-
enth amendment does embody sovereign immunity principles, but
in the form they existed at common law. The doctrine was not
absolute, but was subject to qualifications, such as the ultra vires
liability of state officials.120
Cases decided subsequent to Ex parte Young considered and
restricted the scope of the fictional distinction between the state
and its officials. Ex parte Young was not applied to suits against
state officials in which monetary relief would come not from the
individual, but from the state treasury. In Edelman v. Jordan, 21
for example, the Court upheld an injunction requiring a welfare
commissioner to disburse state benefits in conformity with federal
law. It reversed an order requiring the commissioner to make ad-
ditional payments of past benefits which had been improperly cal-
culated. Payment of such retroactive benefits would come directly
from the state treasury and not from the individual. Prospective
relief was considered permissible because it had only an "ancillary
effect" on the state treasury. 2 The majority was willing to in-
dulge in the fictional distinction between the welfare commis-
sioner and the State of Illinois as to orders regarding administra-
tion of the Department in the future, but not as to orders to pay
past benefits which had been illegally withheld. This purported
distinction between prospective and retroactive relief in terms of
its effect on the treasury is not a convincing one. A prospective
118. Id.
119. Id. at 906-11.
120. Id. at 929-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
122. Id. at 664-70.
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order like the one in Pennhurst will cost the Commonwealth sub-
stantially more than would a suit seeking $10,000 in damages, yet
the Edelman distinction will permit the former and not the
latter.
12 3
In Hans, Ex parte Young, and Edelman the Court balanced
state sovereignty against the substantive right raised by the plain-
tiffs. In Hans, vindication of the contract clause would have consti-
tuted too great an intrusion into state sovereignty. Other suits
challenging repudiation of state debts were successful, however,
based on the contract clause, when providing relief did not re-
quire an order compelling payment of state funds.124 Ex parte
Young created a fictional distinction between the State of Minne-
sota and its Attorney General because of the importance of hold-
ing states accountable to the due process clause. In Edelman, the
Court was unwilling to indulge in a similar fiction because the in-
trusion into the heart of state sovereignty-the state's trea-
sury-was perceived as greater than the federal interest at
stake-state conformity with federal welfare regulations. The re-
sort to fictitious and unsatisfactory distinctions in these cases re-
flects an unwillingness on the part of the Court to acknowledge
that its expansive reading of the amendment as incorporating
state sovereignty goes too far in insulating states from federal
court jurisdiction.
It is both misleading and unnecessary for the Court to charac-
terize its state sovereign immunity decisions as jurisdictional rul-
ings. Jurisdictional principles are threshold standards which must
be met in order for a court to consider the merits. In contrast,
these eleventh amendment decisions have considered the merits
and have balanced the relative importance of the rights asserted
123. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Edelman that "the difference between the
type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young
will not in many instances be that between day and night." He also recognized that the
Supreme Court has authorized equitable relief which has had substantial effect on the state
treasury. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667. There may be a basis for the distinction in some in-
stances, however, since in response to an order awarding prospective relief, the state may
choose whether to continue participating in the program, as in Edelman, or to operate
institutions for the retarded, as in Pennhurst. Prospective relief does not normally require
the state to spend funds, but is a conditional imperative; such as, if you operate a school
system it must not be segregated by race, or if you operate a mental hospital and deprive
residents of their liberty you must provide certain conditions for treatment and
habilitation.
124. See Orth, supra note 72, at 431-50; Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1982-2002.
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against the resulting degree of intrusion into state sovereignty.
Viewed from this perspective, the decision in Pennhurst II con-
fronted two apparently conflicting doctrines: state sovereignty and
pendent jurisdiction. The Court adopted an absolute form of state
immunity to the total derogation of pendent jurisdiction.
The mythical absolute sovereign immunity supposedly incor-
porated in the eleventh amendment is particularly inappropriate
in the Pennhurst II context. As the remainder of this Article will
show, pendent jurisdiction doctrine, as it has developed, coupled
with the Erie principle that state law governs pendent claims, ade-
quately protects a state's interest in its sovereignty.
IV. PENDENT JURISDICTION
In a series of decisions rendered soon after Ex parte Young,
the Supreme Court affirmed awards of prospective relief against
state officials on the basis of pendent state law claims.125 Prior to
Pennhurst II the Court never made any distinction between federal
claims and state law claims when it applied the prospective/retro-
active standard of Ex parte Young and Edelman. As recently as two
years prior to Pennhurst II, the Court had described the Ex parte
Young doctrine as applying when state officials act in a manner
which is contrary to "federal or state law."12 These decisions had
considered and rejected eleventh amendment defenses raised by
state defendants. They formed the precedential basis for the dis-
senting Justices' argument in Pennhurst II that pendent jurisdic-
tion claims should be governed by the same YounglEdelman dis-
tinction as governs federal claims.
1 27
The seeds of pendent jurisdiction doctrine were planted in
1824 by Osborn v. Bank of United States.1 28 Chief Justice Marshall
125. See Greene v. Louisville & I.R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917) and its two companion
cases: Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 555 (1917) and Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917); see also Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
126. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982); see also Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 696-97 (1982). The majority was comprised of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice White concurred in the judg-
ment and dissented in part and was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id.
at 714. This decision was premised on precedent which had established, prior to Ex parte
Young, that conduct of state officials, under color of office, which is tortious as a matter of
state law is not protected by the eleventh amendment.
127. See Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 924-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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recognized in Osborn that a federal court has authority to deter-
mine all questions of fact or law which arise in a suit, even those
that go beyond the particular issue which gave rise to federal ju-
risdiction.1 29 In 1909, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.130
expanded the doctrine by applying it to a suit alleging that state
officials' actions in regulating railroad rates violated federal and
state law. Statutory jurisdiction covered only the federal claim,
but the Supreme Court concluded that jurisdiction to decide the
state law claim existed as well because of its relation to the federal
action:
The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the state statute because, as
alleged, it was in violation of the Federal Constitution, gave the Circuit
Court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had the right
to decide all questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal ques-
tions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide
them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only.'
The constitutional authority for pendent jurisdiction is article
III's provision giving federal courts jurisdiction over "cases" and
"controversies." This language does not restrict federal jurisdic-
tion to the issues upon which that jurisdiction is premised. Pen-
dent jurisdiction arises when federal and state issues are suffi-
ciently related to be considered part of the same case or
controversy. In order to fully resolve a dispute over which it has
jurisdiction, a federal court may have to decide issues of state law.
In fact, due to the doctrine of judicial restraint, it is well-estab-
lished that relief should be granted on the basis of state law,
whenever possible, to avoid unnecessary determinations of federal
constitutional questions.132
The modern formulation of pendent jurisdiction doctrine was
established in 1966 in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.1 33 Under
Gibbs, a federal court may adjudicate a state law claim not other-
wise within the federal jurisdiction statutes when it is brought to-
gether with a sufficiently related federal claim134 so that a plaintiff
129. Id. at 822-23.
130. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
131. Id. at 191.
132. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (citing Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909)).
133. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
134. Gibbs held that it is within the constitutional power of a federal court to exercise
pendent jurisdiction whenever state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of
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"would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial pro-
ceeding."' 35 Gibbs expanded the scope of pendent jurisdiction
from the Siler line of cases by permitting determination of the
state law claim whenever it is closely related to a federal claim, not
only when necessary to avoid determination of a federal question.
The Gibbs Court, while announcing an expansive constitu-
tional authority for federal courts to hear pendent state claims,
also emphasized the need for prudential exercise of that jurisdic-
tion. It indicated that lower courts should use discretion in utiliz-
ing their power to determine pendent claims, informed by "con-
siderations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants" and should remain conscious of the federal policy to
avoid needless determinations of state law."3 6 Thus, a plaintiff
does not have a right to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction,
rather it is a discretionary power to be extended only when sup-
ported by policy considerations.
The Pennhurst litigation was a model example of pendent ju-
risdiction under the Siler and Gibbs standards. Plaintiffs challenged
the conditions at Pennhurst as violative of federal and state law,
sought identical relief under both legal theories, and based each
claim on the same set of facts. The court of appeals granted relief
on the basis of state law, thereby avoiding the federal constitu-
tional claim.'
37
In order to justify its conclusion that the pendent claim in
Pennhurst II was barred, the Supreme Court majority had to ex-
plain why its prior decisions granting relief on state law grounds
had not already settled the issue of whether federal courts may
exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims against state of-
ficials. Further, the Court had to justify why the conflict between
pendent jurisdiction doctrine based on article III, and the sover-
eign immunity principles embodied in the eleventh amendment
should be resolved in favor of the latter. Justice Powell's opinion
failed to do either satisfactorily.
The majority asserted that none of its prior decisions had ad-
dressed the issue in Pennhurst II: the application of the eleventh
operative fact." Id. at 725.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 726.
137. Halderman, 673 F.2d at 650, 658-59.
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amendment to a pendent claim against state officials.1 38 Even if
this was technically correct,13 9 it was disingenuous for Justice Pow-
ell not to give any weight to the implicit finding of jurisdiction
made in the numerous cases cited by the dissent. These decisions
awarded relief against state officials based on pendent claims and
referred, at least in dicta, to the applicability of Ex parte Young to
both state and federal law claims. 140 No prior decision of the Su-
preme Court, no lower court decision, and no commentator had
ever suggested that Ex parte Young might not apply to state law
claims.14 1 The dissent fairly characterized the majority's position
as "repudiating" a method of analyzing eleventh amendment ob-
jections in pendent jurisdiction cases which had gone unques-
tioned for seventy-five years.1 42
Even if it was appropriate to consider as an open question the
138. Justice Powell contended that the eleventh amendment was considered in cases
such as Greene v. Louisville & I.R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917), only in relation to the federal
claim. He concluded that because prospective relief was sought, Ex parte Young permitted
the federal court to hear the federal claims. The Court in Greene went on to award relief
on the basis of the pendent state claims without considering anew the effect which the
eleventh amendment might have on the state claim. The majority concluded that the Pen-
nhurst II issue was thus an open question unaffected by Greene. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at
917-18. The majority also relied upon the principle stated in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528 (1974), modified, 560 F.2d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 1977), that when "questions ofjurisdiction
have been passed ... sub silentio,. . . [the] Court has never considered itself bound when
a subsequent case . . . [explicitly] brings the jurisdiction issue before [the Court]." Pen-
nhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 918 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 533 n.5).
139. Justice Stevens vigorously dissented from the majority's reading of Greene and
prior decisions. He concluded that these decisions "explicitly consider and reject the claim
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctive relief based
on state law. There is therefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue
presented by this case is an open one." Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 928 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
140. See, e.g., Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982); Florida Dep't of State v. Trea-
sure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684-85, 690, 697 (1982); Worcester County Trust Co. v.
Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 297, 300 (1937); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd.
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 556 (1922); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547, 548
(1918); Greene v. Louisville & I.R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 506, 507 (1917); Lankford v. Platte
Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 464 (1915); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605,
612, 613, 620, 621 (1912); Atchison, T. & S.Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 286
(1912); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 644 (1911).
141. It was noted in the en banc decision of the court of appeals that the state defen-
dants' eleventh amendment objection had not "previously been advanced in this action,
and from the dearth of authorities cited in its support, not previously advanced anywhere."
Halderman, 673 F.2d at 656. Justice Powell's opinion in Pennhurst II does not refer to any
judicial authority or scholarly support for the majority's position.
142. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 943 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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conflict between pendent jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, the
majority's resolution of the issue was deceptively simplistic. The
opinion concluded that pendent jurisdiction must be subject to the
limitation of the eleventh amendment because pendent jurisdic-
tion is merely a judge-made doctrine of convenience, while the
eleventh amendment is an "explicit" constitutional restriction of
federal courts.143 This characterization of the two doctrines over-
states the relationship between state sovereign immunity and the
eleventh amendment and discounts the constitutional underpin-
nings of pendent jurisdiction.
As the prior section demonstrates,4 there is nothing "ex-
plicit" in the eleventh amendment which would bar federal juris-
diction over the pendent claim in Pennhurst II. The Supreme
Court has chosen to use the eleventh amendment as a vehicle for
protecting state sovereignty and has read common law principles
into it. At most, these notions of state sovereignty might be con-
sidered implicit in the amendment; the fairest reading of the
evolving eleventh amendment doctrine, however, is that sovereign
immunity principles are not even implicit in the amendment but
have been developed by the Court acting as a common law court.
Neither pendent jurisdiction nor state sovereign immunity is
explicit in the Constitution. Both doctrines have been recognized
and developed by the Court because of their usefulness in fulfil-
ling the purposes of the federalism scheme and because each has a
plausible source in the language of the Constitution. Pendent ju-
risdiction is as much a constitutionally supported doctrine as is
state sovereign immunity.
Therefore, when the two doctrines are in conflict, as they
may be in suits against a state or its officials, it is misleading to
conclude that state sovereignty always "trumps" pendent jurisdic-
tion. The Court can and should reach an accommodation between
the policies supporting each doctrine, much in the same way that
Ex parte Young was an accommodation between state sovereignty
and the supremacy of federal law. 45
The starting point in reconciling the doctrines of pendent ju-
risdiction and state sovereignty is to recognize that pendent juris-
143. Id. at 917.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 64-125.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 109-24.
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diction involves a discretionary exercise of jurisdiction. A federal
court is not required to hear pendent state law claims, but is per-
mitted to do so when supported by policy considerations. The
Court has articulated as guiding principles: judicial economy, con-
venience and fairness to litigants, tempered by the policy to avoid
unnecessary determinations of state law. 146 The latter point ac-
knowledges that federalism concerns limit the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction. The discretionary decision to entertain pendent state
claims against state officials should include consideration of the
degree of intrusion into state sovereignty which may result.
In making that determination, the federal court should look
to sovereign immunity principles as they have evolved in the af-
fected state. There is no justification, either in history or in policy,
for Pennhurst II's application of an absolute form of sovereign im-
munity. Even if one accepts Justice Powell's premise that the elev-
enth amendment was intended to elevate eighteenth century sov-
ereign immunity doctrine to a constitutional status, common law
immunity principles did not establish an absolute barrier to suits
against state officials. As commentators have amply documented,
suits challenging the legality of governmental action were com-
monplace, both in Britain and in the American Colonies.14 7 While
actions for money damages were generally prohibited, mandamus
and injunctive relief were routinely awarded in suits against the
responsible officials.
The movement away from sovereign immunity and toward
governmental accountability has accelerated in this century with
the passage of state and federal tort claims acts. 4 Through judi-
146. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. See also text accompanying
notes 134-37.
147. See Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1895-99; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Of-
ficers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963); see also Baker, Federalism and the Elev-
enth Amendment, 48 U. CoLo. L. REv. 139, 153-58 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 538-46 (1978); Thorn-
ton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L. J. 293, 305-10 (1980); Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues
in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682, 684-88 (1976); Comment, Private
Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CFH. L. REv. 331, 334-36-(1966). Justice Pow-
ell did not dispute this characterization of the eighteenth century common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
148. The Federal Tort Claims Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504
(repealed 1982), 2110 (repealed 1982), 2401-2402, 2411-2414, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. §
724a; 38 U.S.C. §§ 351, 4116; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2727, 2994b. For a thorough discussion of the
262 [Vol. 34
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ERIE 263
cial decision,1 49 constitutional provision,'"0 or legislative action,
sovereign immunity has become the exception rather than the
rule. An absolute form of immunity, derived as it was from a mo-
narchical form of government, is largely discredited as incompati-
ble with democratic notions of the rule of law and of a govern-
ment ultimately accountable to the people.' 5 '
In Pennhurst II, Justice Powell presented a federalism justifica-
tion for application of an absolute barrier to suit: " [I]t is difficult
to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a
federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their con-
liability of the United States government in tort see, L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS (1981). See also W. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (1957). Several states
have similarly abolished sovereign immunity by statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-141
to 4-165(b) (West 1969 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII RaV. STAT. §§ 662-1 to 662-16 (1976); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 25A.l-25A.22 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258, §§
1-8 (West 1959 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 41.031-41.039 (1979); N.Y. CT. CL ACT. §§ 8-12 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1984-85); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.260-30.300 (1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 to 9-31-7
(1976); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6259-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 5601-5605 (1973 & Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090-4.92.170
(1962 & Supp. 1985). The specific statute must be examined for the parameters of each
state's potential liability. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B app. (1982).
149. In some states sovereign immunity was abolished judicially. See Stone v. Arizona
Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482
P.2d 965 (1971); Spencer v. General Hospital, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 48 (1969) (en banc);
Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284
N.E.2d 733 (1972); Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976); Pittman v. City of
Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 247 N.W.2d 512 (1976); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557
S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Willis v. Department of Conservation, 55 NJ. 534, 264 A.2d 34
(1970); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
150. In some states, sovereign immunity has been abolished by the state constitution:
ALASKA CONsT. art. 1, § 21; DEL CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 13; ILL CONST.
art. 13, § 4; LA. CONST. art. 12, § 1OA; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 18; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17.
151. See Freed, Suits to Remedy Discrimination in Government Employment-The Immunity
Problem, 5 COL. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 383 (1973); Jaffe, supra note 147; Shapiro, supra
note 57, at 62-63. Despite these developments, a few states have persisted in retaining an
absolute, or quasi-absolute form of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Weisner v. Board of
Educ., 237 Md. 391, 206 A.2d 560 (1965) (abrogation of immunity left to legislature);
Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So. 2d 146 (Miss.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977); Sousa v.
State, 115 N.H. 340, 341 A.2d 282 (1975); Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Auth.,
266 S.C. 398, 223 S.E.2d 769 (1976) (scattered statutes have created exceptions);
Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973); Davis v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972); ALA. CoNsT. art. I, § 14; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1
to 63-30-34 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
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duct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the princi-
ples of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.9
1 52
Two possible affronts to state sovereignty underlie his concern:
(1) that a state will be compelled to appear and defend its actions
in a federal court; and (2) the actual imposition of a remedy by
that court against the state. In evaluating the intrusiveness of such
federal court action, one must bear in mind that the Court is con-
sidering state law claims brought along with federal law claims
seeking similar or identical relief. Requiring state officials to ap-
pear and defend the state law claims is not a significant, incremen-
tal affront to state sovereignty since under Ex parte Young the offi-
cials may be sued in federal court on the federal claims.
It is also not clear that federalism is promoted, as Justice Pow-
ell concludes, when a federal court is deprived of state law
grounds for awarding relief as an alternative to federal law claims.
Under the usual rules of judicial restraint, a federal court will
avoid deciding issues of federal constitutional law when there is a
nonconstitutional or state law basis for resolution of the contro-
versy. 15 3 By taking away state law claims in Pennhurst-type cases,
federal courts will necessarily address the remaining federal claims
and may enter comparable relief against the state. It is difficult to
see how a federal court decree based on federal law will result in
any less federal-state friction. Indeed, the state is left with much
less influence over implementation of federal court orders since
its legislature and courts are unable to modify federal law, as they
could shape and interpret the state law which formed the basis for
the Pennhurst decree.
Thus, an absolute form of immunity accomplishes very little
in terms of federalism, and what it does accomplish is at substan-
tial cost. The negative consequences of Pennhurst II, which are
discussed in the concluding portions of this Article, include the
further complication of federal court jurisdictional doctrines by
establishing different interpretations of the eleventh amendment
for state and federal claims. It will also lead to protracted litiga-
tion over the propriety of "splitting" state and federal claims into
separate actions and will increase the pressure on civil rights liti-
152. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 911.
153. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (discussed supra
notes 128-32); Slier v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). See also Justice Stevens'
discussion of Siler in Pennhurst II. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 939-42.
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gants to bring federal claims in state court rather than in federal
court.
In summary, the eleventh amendment should not be seen as
an absolute jurisdictional bar to pendent state law claims against
state officials. Such a reading is not mandated by the language,
legislative history, previous construction or purposes of the
amendment; moreover it undervalues the considerations which
support pendent jurisdiction. Federal courts should have discre-
tion, informed by the factors previously discussed, to hear state
law claims against state officials. In adjudicating such claims, the
federal court should apply state law, including state sovereign im-
munity doctrine.In application, this approach would result in the
Ex parte Young/Edelman rules for federal claims which also govern
pendent state law claims. In balancing state sovereignty against
the benefits of pendent jurisdiction, monetary relief will usually
not be available because the integrity of the state treasury lies at
the heart of state sovereignty.'" Declaratory and injunctive relief
are not so intrusive and would be more freely allowed. Even
though the distinctions drawn in Ex parte Young and Edelman are
themselves not totally satisfactory,1 55 the advantages of pendent
jurisdiction are best achieved if the same types of claims and relief
are permitted under both state and federal law.
The next sections of this Article will explore the policy and
pragmatic problems created by the Pennhurst II decision which
would be avoided under this proposed approach. The majority of
the Pennhurst II Court failed to recognize the full extent of the
difficulties posed by its ruling, and underestimated the detrimental
effects which its decision would have on the litigation of concur-
rent federal and state claims.
V. SCOPE OF PENDENT JURISDICTION AFTER Pennhurst II
The practical effect of Pennhurst II is to relegate nearly all
claims against state officials brought under state law to state
courts. It creates a barrier to suing state officials that will affect a
substantial proportion of pendent jurisdiction claims since the de-
154. Thus, pendent claims for money damages would not be heard by a federal court
unless the state has, as a matter of state law, waived its sovereign immunity in a manner
indicating its willingness to permit suits in courts other than its own.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
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fendant in a federal claim is often a state official.15 6 Some pendent
jurisdiction claims may still be heard after Pennhurst 11. For exam-
ple, claims that do not seek relief from the state-when relief is
sought against county or municipal officials, or against officials
"individually" rather than in their official capacities-may still be
heard in federal court. Likewise, when the state has waived its im-
munity under the eleventh amendment, the suit will not be
barred. These are, however, narrow doctrines as construed by the
Supreme Court and do not mitigate the problems created by Pen-
nhurst 11.
This section of the Article will explore the parameters of the
Pennhurst II ruling by briefly considering those types of claims
that may still be maintained pendent to a federal action. The sub-
sequent section will consider the options which remain for those
actions barred from federal court by Pennhurst 11, and the conse-
quences of those options for the litigation of concurrent federal
and state claims.
A. Suits Against Political Subdivisions of a State
In Pennhurst II, the plaintiffs argued that the lower court
judgment could be upheld insofar as it required county officials to
develop community placements for residents being deinstitutional-
ized from Pennhurst 1 57 The majority reaffirmed that the eleventh
amendment applies only to suits against the state and not to ac-
tions against counties and similar municipal corporations.15 5 The
Court's brief discussion of this issue indicates that it would apply
the same functional test in pendent jurisdiction cases as it has in
federal question suits: if the relief will ultimately come from a lo-
cal official or governmental body sufficiently insulated from the
state, there is no eleventh amendment prohibition regardless of
who is the nominal defendant. 59
Justice Powell suggested that county officials in the Pennhurst
156. For example, the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment and
the "under color of state law" element of section 1983 actions usually dictate that state
officials, and not private parties, are defendants in litigation under those provisions. U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see also Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144
(1970).
157. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 920.
158. Id. at 920 n.34.
159. Id. at 920-21.
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litigation could well be immune because it appeared that state
monies would ultimately finance the changes in county practices
required by the district court.16 0 That factual question was not
reached, however, because relief against the county officials alone
would not accomplish the objectives of the lower court or-
der-deinstitutionalization of patients at Pennhurst, a state insti-
tution. The majority concluded that the discretionary exercise of
pendent jurisdiction, grounded in notions of efficiency and conve-
nience, should not support "partial and incomplete" enforcement
of state law by a federal court when full relief would be available
in a state forum.161
Thus, a pendent suit against a local governmental body or its
officials may avoid the bar of Pennhurst II, but only when complete
relief can be obtained without effects extending beyond that sub-
division. Such a pendent state law claim has to avoid a second sov-
ereign immunity hurdle-the immunity state law may provide to a
municipal or county government."' 2 Under state common law, lo-
cal governments were often immune from suits for money dam-
ages, but not those for injunctive relief. Statutory tort claims acts
have abrogated that absolute immunity in many jurisdictions and
permit recovery against local governmental bodies for injuries re-
sulting from the negligent conduct of local officials and employ-
ees.16 3 These statutes usually establish strict notice requirements
and limitations on amounts recoverable. They also often exclude
officials from liability for claims arising from discretionary actions
providing a complete defense on the merits to such officials."'
Thus, county officials who operate an institution like Pennhurst
160. Id. at 921.
161. Id.
162. It is helpful to contrast the treatment of federal and state law claims in this re-
spect. In a section 1983 claim, for example, the Supreme Court has ruled, as a matter of
construction of that federal statute, that a municipality has no immunity from suit. Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, if a section 1983
claim against a municipality avoids the jurisdictional limitation on federal courts of the elev-
enth amendment, because no relief is sought against the state, then there is no sovereign
immunity defense on the merits available to the defendant. However, for a state law pendent
claim, there may well be a defense on the merits in addition to the jurisdictional barrier of
the eleventh amendment, namely, that state law does not permit such relief against a
municipality.
163. Most states have judicially or legislatively abrogated sovereign immunity under
the common law. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1978).
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might be protected from suit under a state tort claims act even
though not protected by the eleventh amendment.
B. Suits Against State Officials in an Individual Capacity
The fact that an official was acting within the scope of his or
her office and under the apparent authority of state law, does not
mean that a suit challenging those actions is necessarily against the
defendant in an "official capacity." The fact that a particular deci-
sion was made while the defendant was acting in an "official ca-
pacity" is not dispositive for purposes of eleventh amendment
analysis. It is the nature of the relief sought, not the apparent au-
thority for the conduct, which determines whether a suit is against
a defendant in an official or individual capacity.165
A suit is against a defendant in an "official capacity" when the
remedy is to be provided by the official qua officeholder. Any
monies awarded in such a suit come from the budget of the appli-
cable agency or governmental treasury and injunctive relief re-
quires the official to change agency rules or practices. If the
named defendant ceases to serve in that office, the new office-
holder is substituted as a party defendant. 
1 6
An action against a defendant "individually" or in an "indi-
vidual capacity" seeks relief not from the agency or governmental
body, but directly from the individual defendant. Most commonly,
damages are sought against state officials in their individual capac-
ities since damages sought against persons in their official capaci-
ties would be payable from state funds and thus be barred by
Edelman. The obligation to pay any judgment in such a suit rests
on the individual defendant.
167
Since a suit brought against a state official "individually"
seeks no relief from the state, the eleventh amendment presents
no barrier to such an action in a federal court. The majority opin-
ion in Pennhurst II referred to cases establishing this distinction
for federal claims against state officials in a way indicating that a
similar rule would be applied for pendent state law claims seeking
165. See, e.g., Pennhurst H, 104 S. Ct. at 911-12 & n.17.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).
167. Many state and local governments, however, choose to indemnify their employ-
ees as long as the actions in question were taken in good faith and were within the scope of
their office. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258, § 13 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984-85).
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relief from state officials individually.16 8
This "individual capacity" exception to the eleventh amend-
ment does not provide adequate relief in many situations because
state law provides a defense on the merits. Under tort claims acts
in many states, officials are relieved of any liability for their negli-
gent actions and relief is only available against their employing
governmental body. 6 9 In other states, officials have a qualified im-
munity-good faith defense-to claims for damages. This allows
the official to avoid liability when the actions were taken in good
faith, albeit, illegal or unconstitutional. If the goal of litigation is
to establish the fact that official conduct violates state or federal
law, a suit for damages, against an official "individually," will
often fail because of the good faith defense. A suit for declaratory
and/or injunctive relief, in an official capacity, may succeed how-
ever, because the good faith of the defendant is not relevant.
1 70
C. State Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In many respects, the immunity from federal suit provided by
the eleventh amendment is treated as a limitation on subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. However, the immunity provided by the
amendment differs from subject matter jurisdiction in that suits,
168. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 912-14, nn.17 & 21.
169. At common law in most states, officials could be individually liable for harm they
caused when acting egregiously or in bad faith, but the state itself was immune. When
legislatures waived sovereign immunity and permitted tort judgments against the state
based on the conduct of its employees, it was commonly provided that the statutory remedy
against the state was to be the exclusive remedy against either the state or the employee.
See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984-85).
170. The Pennhurst litigation is a good example of this common outcome: the trial
court found that the defendants had acted in good faith in operating Pennhurst and there-
fore denied any monetary relief against them individually, while it provided extensive in-
junctive relief to conform defendants' policies and practices to state and federal law. Pen-
nhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 904 & n.l. In those cases where defendant is unsuccessful in raising
a good faith defense, a claim against an official individually may be effective both in com-
pensating the plaintiff and in altering government policies. Although ajudgment against an
official in an individual capacity does not order policy changes by the defendant, it does
entail a determination that the official acted unconstitutionally or illegally. Its deterrent
effect, therefore, may effectively compel future compliance. Also, a money judgment
against an official is as good as a judgment against the governmental body in those jurisdic-
tions which indemnify officials acting within the scope of their office.
171. For example, immunity may be raised as an objection at any point in the litiga-
tion, even for the first time on appeal. This is consistent with the incorporation approach
which treats sovereign immunity as a limitation on the federal judicial power under article
III. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 907.
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otherwise outside of the judicial power, may be heard if the state
consents to suit.1 72 Might a pendent state claim, particularly one
based on a statute permitting suit against a state, such as a tort
claims act, be heard in federal court under the consent doctrine?
Because of the narrowness of the consent, or waiver concept as
developed by the Supreme Court, there will be few instances
where pendent state claims avoid the eleventh amendment on this
basis.
Consent analysis begins with a presumption against waiver of
the immunity:
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held
that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court .... We have
insisted, however, that the State's consent be unequivocally expressed ...
Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal
courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in our federal system. A State's constitutional
interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but
where it may be sued.23
The distinction mentioned, between a states' interest in
whether it is sued and where it is sued, reflects the difference be-
tween a waiver of state law sovereign immunity and a waiver of
the eleventh amendment. The Court in Pennhurst II reiterated
that a state's waiver of its state law sovereign immunity in its own
courts, such as that embodied in a tort claims act, is not to be
construed as a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity in fed-
172. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3524, at 159-66 & nn.72-78 (2d ed. 1982). Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, 17 GA. L. REv. 513 (1983). In addition to the "consent" doctrine, the Supreme
Court has recognized that states may be subject to federal jurisdiction when Congress has
legislated to abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity. Some decisions appeared to en-
dorse an "implied consent" doctrine to justify non-application of eleventh amendment im-
munity. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 194-96 (1964). Subsequent deci-
sions have pulled back from that rationale. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673
(1974). Later decisions conclude that Congress can "waive" or abrogate the state's elev-
enth amendment immunity when it is implementing other substantive provisions of the
Constitution. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 74, at 152-54. This line of authority was not
discussed in Pennhurst 11 and is not relevant to this Article which considers federal jurisdic-
tion over claims based on state law. For an insightful discussion of Congressional power to
overrule Pennhurst II's limitation of federal court jurisdiction over pendent state law claims
see, Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Power
of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343
(1985).
173. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 907.
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eral court.174 There must be a "clear declaration of the state's in-




The plaintiffs in Pennhurst II had contended that state legisla-
tion abrogating sovereign immunity in certain respects had the ef-
fect of waiving the state's immunity from suit in federal courts.
This was rejected because the Pennsylvania statutes expressly pro-
vided that the legislation should not be construed to waive the
eleventh amendment immunity of the commonwealth. 6 It ap-
pears from the Court's brief discussion of this issue that it will find
consent to suit in federal court only when there is an express
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity.
7 7
VI. LITIGATION OF PENDENT CLAIMS BARRED BY Pennhurst II
Because of the limited scope of the consent/waiver doctrine
and, in many cases, the inadequacy of relief solely against local
governmental bodies or against officials in their individual capaci-
ties, a significant proportion of pendent jurisdiction claims are ef-
fectively barred from federal court by Pennhurst II. As the major-
174. Id. at 907 n.9.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 909 n.12.
177. Justice White suggested a less stringent standard in his concurring opinion in
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (White, J., concurring). He concluded that
a Florida statute allowing the Board of Regents to sue and be sued in "all courts of law and
equity" was a waiver of the state's eleventh amendment immunity. Id. at 519. There was
no need for the federal courts to be expressly mentioned in order to be an effective waiver.
In Patsy, Justice Powell disagreed with Justice White and would have required evidence of
an intent to waive immunity in federal court. Id. at 522-23 & n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Prior to Pennhurst II, lower courts were divided over the question of whether consent to
suit, as found in state tort claims statutes, waived sovereign immunity only to the extent of
permitting suit against the state in state court, or also allowed suits in federal court. In the
following cases, state and federal courts held that a state's waiver of immunity in its own
courts did not constitute a waiver of the eleventh amendment: Verner v. Colorado, 533 F.
Supp. 1109 (D. Colo. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2175 (1984); Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F.
Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981) (certified question to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
answered in Irwin v. Comm'r, 388 Mass. 810, 448 N.E.2d 721 (1983)); New Hampshire v.
Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 470 A.2d 869, (1983). Compare Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500
F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980) which found a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity to be
"sweeping," id. at 1216, and "extraordinarily liberal in comparison to then-existing law in
most states," id., and concluded it waived the state's eleventh amendment immunity. Some
courts and commentators have questioned the constitutionality of permitting state law to
dictate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292
F.2d 711, 713-14 (4th Cir. 1961); C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 274-75 (1960).
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ity opinion noted, this leaves litigants wishing to raise concurrent
state and federal claims with two options: either file separate suits
in state and federal court, or file both claims in state court .17 The
majority appears to assume that each option would actually result
in an adjudication on the merits of both the state and federal
claims and that the unavailability of a federal court to hear both is
a relatively minor inconvenience.
The Pennhurst II majority seriously underestimated the policy
and pragmatic implications of its decision. As the next sections
demonstrate, it is doubtful that the merits of each claim will be
reached if the suit is split between state and federal court. If both
claims are brought in state court, the chances of obtaining rulings
on the merits are increased; however the resulting pressure on liti-
gants to file federal claims in state courts conflicts with Congres-
sional purposes behind the federal jurisdictional statutes.
A. "Splitting" State and Federal Claims
In suggesting that a post-Pennhurst 11 litigant may "bifurcate"
the claims, the majority implied that simultaneous suits regarding
the same transaction or occurrence may be maintained in state
and federal court. That is the general rule, but it is one riddled
with judicially created, discretionary exceptions. The various
forms of federal court abstention 179 allow or require a federal
court to defer to a pending state proceeding. If the federal and
state claims in Pennhurst had been separated and brought in fed-
eral and state court respectively, a federal court might have stayed
its proceedings under the Colorado River doctrine.180
178. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 919-20.
179. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976) (discussed infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) (federal court may not interfere with pending state court proceeding concerned
with important state interests); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (federal court
should abstain in cases involving closely regulated industries of special importance to the
state).
180. In Colorado River, the Supreme Court held that a federal court could stay its
proceedings pending the outcome of a parallel state court proceeding involving the same
parties and arising out of the same transaction. In a majority opinion by Justice Brennan
the Court noted the general rule that the pendency of a state action is not a bar to federal
proceedings, 424 U.S. at 817, but held, however, that there are exceptions to this general
rule, based on "exceptional circumstances," id. at 813, that allow a federal court to stay its
proceedings (quoting Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). The
policy behind such stay is the promotion of "wise judicial administration," conservation of
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A federal judge would presumably be concerned about the
inefficient use of judicial resources if both state and federal court
systems adjudicate the same dispute. The preference would nor-
mally be to have one case delayed and determine whether addi-
tional consideration is really necessary.""1 Usually a federal court
cannot enjoin the state action; the statutory restriction of the
Anti-Injunction Statutel8 2 and the comity-based restraint of
Younger normally would prohibit such intervention. Thus, the only
mechanism available to a federal court to avoid duplication is a
stay of the federal action. Under the Colorado River doctrine, a
federal court may stay federal proceedings as a matter of judicial
economy, in light of pending state proceedings, when there are
"exceptional circumstances." '
The breadth of this standard has been a source of debate
within the Court and a source of division among the lower courts.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Colorado River emphasized the usual
obligation of the federal courts to exercise their statutory jurisdic-
tion despite pending state proceedings, although it concluded that
the "exceptional circumstances" of that case justified absten-
tion."8 ' In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,' s5 the plurality opin-
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation. Id. at 818.
181. In such situations, a state court might stay its proceedings in deference to the
federal suit in a plea of abatement. See D. LouLsELI, G. HAZARD & C. TArT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL 637-42 (1983).
182. The Anti-Injunction Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
183. In Colorado River, the United States had filed a federal court action to declare
United States and indian water rights in Colorado Water Division No. 7. The United States
had brought similar suits in state court concerning water districts four through six. Peti-
tioners brought suit in state court under the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666
(1980) (gives consent to state jurisdiction concurrent with federal jurisdiction over contro-
versies involving federal water rights), seeking declaration of water rights to Water District
No. 7 against the United States. The petitioners (defendants in the federal court action)
sought dismissal of the federal claim, and joinder of the federal claims in state court. The
federal district court then abstained from further proceedings. The court of appeals re-
versed and the Supreme Court action followed. Justice Brennan reviewed the purposes of
the McCarran Amendment and found that the avoidance of piecemeal litigation was its
most significant intent. Id. at 819. Because of the nature of water rights litigation and the
McCarran Amendment's specific purpose to avoid piecemeal litigation, the majority con-
cluded that "exceptional circumstances" existed which permitted the federal court to stay
the federal proceeding pending the outcome of the state action. Id. at 818-20.
184. Id. at 813.
185. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
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ion of Justice Rehnquist appeared to endorse an expanded use of
the stay doctrine. He concluded that the decision to stay federal
proceedings in favor of pending state proceedings is within the
discretion of the district court and is not reviewable in an action
for mandamus.18 6 Some federal courts, in response to Will, have
freely exercised stays under Colorado River when judicial economy
will be served. 1 7 The Supreme Court's most recent decision ap-
plying Colorado River, however, indicates that these lower court
decisions to stay have gone further than the Court intended. In
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,188 a
stay order was reversed. The majority, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, concluded that a judge's discretion in granting a stay is
reviewable under the Colorado River standard as a final order. Jus-
tice Brennan indicated that despite Will's apparent liberalization
of the Colorado River doctrine, "exceptional circumstances" are
nonetheless required and had not been shown to exist.180
It is not easy to predict how the Colorado River doctrine would
be applied to a bifurcated Pennhurst suit. On one hand, judicial
economy would usually be served by a stay of federal proceedings.
On the other hand, Moses H. Cone, the most recent guide, indi-
cates that the obligation of federal courts to exercise their statu-
tory jurisdiction will, in most cases, outweigh a concern for judi-
cial economy. A stay is only appropriate when there are
186. Id. at 665-66 n.7.
187. For a more thorough discussion of the Colorado River stay doctrine and its appli-
cation in lower courts see Comment, The Viability of Stays of Federal Actions Pending the Out-
comes of Parallel State Litigation, 54 CHL [-] KEr L. REv. 614 (1977); Note, The Appealability
of Federal Court Orders Denying Stays in Deference to Concurrent State Court Proceedings, 59
IND. L.J. 65 (1984); Note, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State
Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHL L. REv. 641 (1977). For a discus-
sion of the practice of federal courts vis-a-vis stays in favor of pending state proceedings
prior to Colorado River, see Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently
Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 684 (1960).
188. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
189. In Moses H. Cone, the issue of whether parties to a construction contract were
required to honor an arbitration clause came before both the federal and state courts. The
federal court stayed the proceedings, and the federal plaintiff appealed the order to stay.
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion byJustice Brennan, held that the stay order is a
"final" order within 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and therefore is appealable. Id. at 10-13 & n.l .
The Court held that despite Will's language apparently undermining the Colorado River
standard, the test was indeed the one of "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 16-19 & n.20.
The Court held that a judge's discretion in granting a stay order was reviewable under the
standards of Colorado River. Because there had been no showing in Moses H. Cone that "ex-
ceptional circumstances" existed, the Supreme Court reversed the stay order.
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"exceptional circumstances. '"190
Even when parallel state and federal actions are permitted,
there will be claim and issue preclusion consequences which will
substantially narrow, or totally preclude, the second court's con-
sideration of the remaining claim as soon as one proceeds to judg-
ment.' The Supreme Court's decision in Migra v. Warren City
School District Board of Education,1 92 handed down the same day as
Pennhurst II, demonstrates the risks posed by the preclusion doc-
trine if a plaintiff splits federal and state causes of action into sepa-
rate suits.
In Migra, the plaintiff successfully litigated state law claims in
an Ohio state court suit. The litigation resulted in her reinstate-
ment as a supervisor of elementary education along with an award
of back pay. She sought additional relief in federal court, assert-
ing that non-renewal of her contract was intended to punish her
for her exercise of first amendment rights, had the effect of de-
priving her of property without due process of law, and denied
her equal protection. The Supreme Court ruled that claim preclu-
sion could bar the federal claims because they could have been
raised' in the prior state proceeding. 193
The analysis of claim and issue preclusion consequences de-
pends upon which suit, state or federal, goes to judgment first.
The litigants cannot control the pace at which separate suits will
proceed to judgment, so when considering the consequences of
splitting state and federal claims, it is necessary to consider two
scenarios-the effect of a state judgment on a pending federal suit
190. The factors included in the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River
and Moses H. Cone appear to include the following: whether either state or federal court
asserted jurisdiction over a "res"; the inconvenience of the federal forum; avoidance of
piecemeal litigation; which case was filed first; presence of federal law issues and the ade-
quacy of the state tribunal. 460 U.S. at 25-26. Further, the Court stated in Moses H. Cone
that the "task in cases such as this [simultaneous federal and state proceedings] is not to
find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . rather, the task is
to ascertain whether there exist exceptional circumstances . . . to justify the surrender of
that jurisdiction." Id.
191. As the next section will demonstrate, application of claim preclusion will bar any
subsequent action between the same parties based on the same transaction or occurrence.
Application of issue preclusion binds a party to the specific findings made in a prior pro-
ceeding thereby limiting the issues to be determined in the second proceeding. If there is
substantial overlap in the dispositive issues in the two proceedings issue, preclusion may
justify summary judgment in the second proceeding.
192. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
193. Id. at 894-98.
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("state-federal" preclusion) and the effect which a federal judg-
ment will have on a pending state proceeding ("federal-state"
preclusion).
1. State-Federal Preclusion. A sequence of decisions, starting
with Allen v. McCurry94 and concluding with Migra, established
that the Full Faith and Credit Statute19 5 governs preclusion ques-
tions in state-federal litigation. The statute requires that a federal
court generally give a state court judgment the same claim and
issue preclusive effect as would the state court that rendered the
prior judgment 98
In Allen, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that ac-
tions under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act should be exempt
from usual issue preclusion rules because of the legislative pur-
poses of that statute and its jurisdictional counterpart.1 9 7 The Al-
len majority recognized that section 1983 was intended to provide
the option of a federal forum to litigants wishing to escape state
court adjudication of federal issues.19 8 However, it concluded that
194. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
195. The implementing statute of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution is
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Section 1738 provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such
State, Territory or Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of
any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be
proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if
a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said
attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or
copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken.
196. Prior to 1980, the Supreme Court had not been clear in its treatment of preclu-
sion when a state judgment preceded federal litigation. The full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution had been interpreted, along with its implementing statute, section 1738,
to require state courts to give full effect to another state's judgments. However, the consti-
tutional clause has no application to state-federal litigation and in such cases the court had
not consistently applied section 1738, but appeared to rely instead on federal common law
principles of preclusion. See Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63
N.C.L. REv. 59, 63-101 (1984).
197. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was the source of section 1983 as a cause of
action for enforcing federal constitutional rights, also created original jurisdiction in the
federal district courts to hear such actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), reproduced supra
note 17; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), reproduced supra note 15.
198. The federal forum was provided because of congressional distrust of the state
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the Full Faith and Credit Statute, enacted in 1789, should govern
since section 1983, passed in 1871, did not expressly or impliedly
repeal the earlier statute. There was no irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the choice of forum purpose of section 1983 and the issue
preclusion principle that a party who voluntarily litigates an issue
in the state court should be bound by that court's
determination.199
Migra decided an issue which had been reserved in Al-
len-whether usual rules of claim preclusion should be applied in
section 1983 suits to preclude litigation of claims which could
have been raised but which were not actually litigated in a prior
state proceeding. A unanimous Supreme Court ruled that section
1738 provides the rule of decision for claim preclusion as well as
issue preclusion questions. The Court found no policy justifica-
tions for distinguishing between the issue and claim preclusive ef-
fects of state court judgments.0 0
In Migra, the plaintiff argued that she should be permitted
the choice of a federal forum for her federal claims and a state
forum for her state law claims, in order to take advantage of the
relative expertise of both court systems. The Court rejected this
justification for claim splitting between federal and state court:
Although such a division may seem attractive from a plaintiff's perspective,
it is not the system established by § 1738. That statute embodies the view
that it is more important to give full faith and credit to state-court judg-
ments than to ensure separate forums for federal and state claims. This re-
flects a variety of concerns, including notions of comity, the need to prevent
vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial resources.
20 1
Applying Migra and Allen to a situation where federal and
state claims are split, it is apparent that a state judgment will
nearly always result in claim preclusion of the federal action. In
those cases where claim preclusion may be avoided, issue preclu-
sion will dramatically narrow, if not effectively decide, the federal
issues.
a. Claim Preclusion. Claim preclusion, commonly referred to
courts to enforce the newly created federal rights of the Reconstruction era amendments
and civil rights statutes. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-42 (1972).
199. Allen, 449 U.S. at 90, 98-99.
200. Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 897-98.
201. Id. at 898.
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as res judicata,0 2 provides that a final judgment may preclude
later relitigation by the same parties of claims or defenses that
arose from the same transaction and which were raised or could
have been raised in a prior proceeding. 03 After Pennhurst II the
prerequisites for claim preclusion will usually be satisfied where
federal and state claims are litigated separately.
In the Pennhurst litigation, for example, the state law claim
was pending against the same state and county officials as the fed-
eral claims. Nominal differences as to the parties in the two pro-
ceedings would probably not avoid preclusion, since officials in a
position to provide the relief requested on state and federal claims
would presumably be considered to be in "privity" with each
other.204
In most jurisdictions, separate lawsuits are seen as raising the
"same claim" when they arise out of the same transaction or oc-
currence and may be conveniently tried together. 20 5 This is essen-
202. This Article uses the terminology of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to de-
scribe the preclusive effects of judgments on civil actions. The traditional terms, res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel, are still employed by many courts to identify the claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion consequences of a judgment. The United States Supreme Court
adopted the Restatement terminology in Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 894 n.1. The Restatement termi-
nology conveys more precisely the preclusion concepts under consideration. Res judicata
has been used interchangeably to describe the general field of preclusion as well as the
more particular concepts of merger and bar within claim preclusion. The concept of estop-
pel also may be confusing in this context because parties may be "estopped" from asserting
a position in litigation for reasons other than a prior judgment. For a discussion of these
points, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS introduction at 1-5.
203. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94. Claim preclusion has two constituent principles--merger
and bar. The general rule of merger is that a valid and final judgment in favor of the
plaintiff will extinguish all claims that the plaintiff had against defendant arising from the
same transaction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 202, at § 18. The
plaintiff may sue on the judgment, but may not maintain a separate action on the original
claim or any part thereof. Defenses are also merged in the judgment so that the defendant
cannot raise defenses that might have been interposed, or were interposed in the first ac-
tion. Id. The general rule of bar is that a valid and final judgment in favor of the defen-
dant prohibits another action by the plaintiff on the same claim. Id. at §§ 19 & 20. Both
the merger and bar aspects of claim preclusion apply to claims and defenses that could
have been, but were not litigated, as well as those that actually were litigated and deter-
mined. Id. at § 18 comment a; § 19.
204. The concept of "privity" was traditionally employed to describe the identity of
interests that justified holding a non-party to a judgment to the same extent as a party to
the action. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1979), the Supreme Court
adopted the functional approach suggested in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 202, at § 39.
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 202, at § 24 and comments
thereafter. See also id. at §§ 18, 19. This is a broader concept than the traditional preclu-
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tially the same standard that governs pendent jurisdiction.
20 6
Thus, whenever state and federal claims are sufficiently related to
have supported pendent jurisdiction pre-Pennhurst II, they will be
treated as the "same claim" for preclusion purposes if they are
split post-Pennhurst II. Finally, the fact that federal claims can be
brought in state courts of general jurisdiction means that the
"could have been raised" requirement will usually be satisfied as
well in state-federal litigation.
There are a few instances in which claim preclusion may be
avoided. One is when the state which rendered the prior judg-
ment utilizes a narrow concept of the "same cause of action"
which would permit suits seeking relief on different legal theories
to be prosecuted separately. 07 In such instances, Migra and sec-
tion 1738 direct application of state law rather than the more en-
compassing "same claim" standard employed by the federal
courts.20 8 Claim preclusion may be inapplicable in other cases be-
cause the federal claim could not have been brought in the state
proceeding, either because of the limited jurisdiction of the state
tribunal20 9 or because the federal claim is within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the federal courts.210 It will be the rare case in which
sion rule which distinguished between different "causes of action" and permitted and
sometimes required separate litigation of different legal theories of recovery, even if based
on the same evidence. Most modern systems of procedure permit the joinder of all theories
of recovery and forms of relief in a single lawsuit; the expanding concept of the "same
claim" requires joinder in a single suit, with claim preclusion as the sanction if not joined.
206. Pendent jurisdiction under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs may be exercised where
the claims "derive from [a] common nucleus of operative fact" such that a plaintiff "would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
207. See supra note 205.
208. Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 899. See also id. at 899-900 (White, J., concurring).
209. For example, the New York Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
state law claims against the state for money damages, but has no jurisdiction to award equi-
table relief or money damages against state officials in their individual capacities. Murphy
v. Schuler, 74 Misc. 2d 732, 345 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Braun v. State, 203
Misc. 563, 117 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. Ct.CI. 1952). Therefore, a judgment of the court of
claims will not preclude a subsequent claim for damages and injunctive relief against state
officials.
210. A state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a claim that falls within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (bank-
ruptcy proceeding). In Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct.
1327 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that section 1738 governs in state-federal litigation
unless the exclusive federal jurisdiction statute expressly or impliedly repeals its full faith
and credit provisions. Id. at 1332. As a result of the Court's narrow application of the
implied repeal doctrine, a federal court will usually follow state preclusion doctrine and
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claim preclusion can be avoided when federal and state claims are
split and the state suit goes to judgment first.
b. Issue Preclusion. Even if one avoids the total bar of claim
preclusion, state-federal litigation will result in the preclusion of
issues which were actually litigated in the prior state proceeding.
In Allen, for example, the federal court plaintiff sued police of-
ficers for damages arising out of an allegedly unconstitutional
search of his apartment. He had unsuccessfully moved, in previous
state criminal proceedings, to suppress the evidence seized on the
basis of the illegality of the search. Claim preclusion was not in-
volved since the parties were not the same in both cases-the po-
lice officers were not parties to the criminal prosecution-and also
because the civil damage claim could not have been raised in the
criminal prosecution. However, the federal suit was effectively re-
stricted by issue preclusion, since the state court had actually liti-
gated and determined the issue of the constitutionality of the
.search in the suppression hearing.211
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, binds par-
ties to a prior suit to the specific findings of fact and law made in
that proceeding. When the same issues arise in the context of an-
other claim, they may not be relitigated. For issue preclusion to
apply, the issue must be the same as the one previously litigated, it
must have been actually litigated, actually determined, and essen-
tial to the prior judgment. In addition, the party being precluded
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the previous proceeding.
212
In situations where claim preclusion is not applicable-for ex-
ample, where the federal claim is seen as a different cause of ac-
tion, or one that could not have been joined in the state proceed-
ing-the litigants will still be bound by specific rulings made in
the state proceeding. When there is a substantial overlap in the
facts and legal theories underlying the state and federal claims,
issue preclusion may effectively determine the outcome of the fed-
preclusion will not occur since the federal claim could not have been joined in the state
proceeding. In Marrese, Justice O'Connor ruled that a federal court may not give greater
preclusive effect to a state court judgment than would the state courts themselves. Id. at
1332-33.
211. Allen, 449 U.S. at 91-99.
212. Id. at 94; See also RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 202, at §§27-
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eral suit. In the Pennhurst litigation, for example, the plaintiffs re-
lied upon the same facts regarding conditions at the institution
and the same legal theory-a right to habilitation in the least re-
strictive setting-for both the state and federal claims. If a state
court found that the institution was well-kept, safe and provided
effective treatment programs, those factual conclusions would be
binding on the parties in a subsequent federal proceeding. Be-
cause such findings would be critical to the federal action, they
presumably would lead to summary judgment for defendants.213
2. Federal-State Preclusion. If the federal court is the first to
enter judgment, there are different preclusion consequences for
the state law claim. Claim preclusion should not be appropriate in
cases like Pennhurst since the state claim could not have been
joined in the federal suit because of the eleventh amendment; is-
sue preclusion would normally be invoked, however, and could ef-
fectively be dispositive of the merits in the second action.
There are no federal statutory or constitutional provisions
which expressly dictate the effect which a state court must give to
a prior federal judgment. 21 4 Nor has the United States Supreme
Court established principles of preclusion which are binding on
the states in federal-state litigation. 215 Nevertheless, state courts
213. As with claim preclusion, there is some variation among states regarding the ele-
ments of issue preclusion. The most significant distinction involves the "mutuality" re-
quirement: the parties must be the same in each suit. The modem trend is to permit a non-
party to use issue preclusion against one who was a party to the prior proceeding and who
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971); REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTs, supra note 202, at § 29. However, several
states retain the mutuality requirement for application of issue preclusion. See, e.g., Eliason
Corp. v. Bureau of Safety & Regulation, 564 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1983). In a federal
suit following a judgment by such a state court, the federal court would not preclude unless
there is mutuality, even though federal preclusion doctrine might permit preclusion. This
follows from the Supreme Court's reliance on section 1738 and its directive to accord a
state judgment the same effect as would the courts of the rendering state. Haring v.
Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368, 2373-74 (1983). See also Marrese v. American Academy of Ortho-
pedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
214. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1738, only address the effect which must be given to state court judgments.
215. See Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). The Supreme Court expressly stated
that where the federal court decided the question of its jurisdiction as a contested issue, the
state court in subsequent proceedings was barred from re-examining that determination of
jurisdiction, even if it was erroneous. Id. at 171-72. The Supreme Court held also that the
predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was a broader dictate than the Constitutional full faith
and credit provision, article IV, section 1. See REv. STAT. § 905, 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1940).
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uniformly accept the fact that they should accord finality to fed-
eral judgments, identifying differing sources for that obligation:
the United States Constitution,216 the Full Faith and Credit Stat-
ute, 21 7 state statutes21 and state common law.
21 9
Although the need for deference is recognized, there is diver-
gence of opinion as to the extent of the obligation. Most states
have not felt bound to apply federal principles of preclusion.220
Typically, the federal judgment is treated as if it were a state
court judgment for purposes of claim and issue preclusion. As a
result, federal judgments are not given completely uniform effect
in subsequent state court suits, since the rules of claim and issue
preclusion vary somewhat from state to state.
a. Claim Preclusion. The key question for. application of
claim preclusion in this context is whether the claim raised in the
state proceeding could have been raised in the prior federal ac-
tion. It is usually presumed that a state law claim which is factually
related to a previously adjudicated federal claim would have been
heard in the prior action under pendent jurisdiction.222 However,
Per that statute the Court stated that the federal judgment had the "same dignity" in state
courts as would similar decrees of the state court, in a like case, under similar circum-
stances. Id. at 170. The Court's opinion did not discuss this application of the statute at
length; it specifically refused to identify the full preclusive effect the federal judgment was
to be accorded and apparently left the resolution of the latter for state courts.
216. See Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, 133 Cal. App. 3d 658, 184 Cal. Rptr. 138 vacated
in part, 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982); Pettijohn v. Dade County, 446
So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1984); Collector of Revenue v. Tenneco Oil Co., 206 So. 2d 302 (La.
1968); but see In re Goodman, 25 Bankr. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (federal decisions are not
constitutionally entitled to full faith and credit); Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d
721 (1951) (Virgin Islands required to give full faith and credit to federal judgment).
217. See O'Brien v. Brickell Townhouse Inc., 439 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Transamerica Trade Co. v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 98 Ill. App. 3d 430, 424
N.E.2d 740 (1981).
218. See Chilivis v. Dasher, 236 Ga. 669, 225 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1976); Anderson v. Phoe-
nix Inv. Council, 387 Mass. 444, 440 N.E.2d 1164, (1982) (state statute was superseded by
federal rules of resjudicata that specified the preclusive effect of federal court judgment);
Federal Deposit Ins. v. Richman, 98 A.D.2d 790, 470 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1983) (procedure for
docketing federal judgments in state court is articulated in state statute).
219. See Johnson v. Besette, 37 Conn. Supp. 891, 442 A.2d 70 (1981); Jones v. Jeffer-
son Parish, 447 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1984); Daly v. Board of Trustees, 524 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975).
220. But see Anderson v. Phoenix Inv. Council, 387 Mass. 444, 440 N.E,2d 1164
(1982).
221. See supra note 214. See also Wilson v. H.J. Wilson Co., 430 So. 2d 1227, 1232
(La. 1983) (issue preclusion does not apply at all in Louisiana state courts).
222. Because the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is a discretionary decision of the fed-
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following Pennhurst II, state law claims against state officials are
absolutely barred as pendent claims in federal court. It follows
that these state claims, which cannot be brought in a federal
court, should not be claim precluded in subsequent state ac-
tions. 223 In the analogous situation for state-federal litigation,
when the second suit is brought under an exclusive federal juris-
diction statute, the federal courts have been fairly uniform in con-
cluding that the federal suit is not claim precluded. 224 Neverthe-
less, some state courts have applied claim preclusion to claims
which they recognized as barred from joinder in a prior federal
suit by the eleventh amendment.225 There is some risk, therefore,
eral court judge, there is some uncertainty in applying the "could have been raised" stan-
dard in such cases. Courts have generally presumed that a state law claim which is factually
related to a claim within federal court jurisdiction could have been raised as a pendent
claim. The burden in federal-state litigation is often placed on the party seeking to litigate
the state claim to prove that the federal court would not have exercised pendent jurisdic-
tion. See Century 21 Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Alabama Real Estate Comm'n, 401 So.
2d 764 (Ala. S. Ct. 1981); Maldonardo v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 380 (Del. Ch. 1980); Mc-
Lean v. Cowen & Co., 48 N.Y.2d 696, 397 N.E.2d 750, 422 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1979). However,
because of the discretionary nature of pendent jurisdiction and the lack of uniformity re-
garding its exercise, other state courts have allowed litigation of the state claim without any
showing by the plaintiff that the claim could not have been brought in federal court. See
Rennie v. Freeway Transport, 55 Or. App. 1008, 640 P.2d 704, rev'd, 294 Or. 319, 656
P.2d 919 (1982); Boyne v. Harrison, 647 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
223. See Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 674 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 701 F.2d
556 (5th Cir. 1983); Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, 133 Cal. App. 3d 658, 184 Cal. Rptr. 138
vacated in part, 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982); Sweatt v. Jarboe, 167
Ga. App. 267, 305 S.E.2d 923 (1983); Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418
(1982); Ferger v. International Ass'n of Bridge Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
Local 483, 94 N.J. Super. 554, 229 A.2d 532, aff'd, 97 N.J. Super. 505, 235 A.2d 482
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1967); Paulk v. Board of Trustees, 119 Misc. 2d 663, 464 N.Y.S.2d
953 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983). But ef. Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 106 Cal. App. 3d 441, 164
Cal. Rptr. 913 (1980).
224. RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social Services, 684 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.
1982); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 257 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund
v. Old Sec. Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1979); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d
958, 983-94 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway
& Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S- 1090 (1979); Cotler
v. Inter-County Orthopedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975); McGough v. First
Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994,
997 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp.,
392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358,
363 (6th Cir. 1967); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1955). See
generally Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S.
75 (1883).
225. In Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983) (en banc) a section
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that litigants may not be able to rely on usual claim preclusion
principles in deciding whether to file separate suits in state and
federal court.
b. Issue Preclusion. Despite the apparent inapplicability of
claim preclusion when the state claims are barred by the eleventh
amendment, issue preclusion may still be dispositive of the state
law claim. 226 Where there is a common factual basis for the fed-
1983 suit was prosecuted in federal court against the State Public Disclosure Committee
(PDC) and the Attorney General based on the defendant's enforcement of an unconstitu-
tionally vague state law. PDC was held to have a qualified immunity from suit and the
Attorney General was held absolutely immune from the section 1983 suit. Subsequently,
the plaintiff brought a section 1983 suit against the state and PDC in state court. The
Washington Supreme Court ruled that preclusion was appropriate, despite the fact that the
state could not have been sued in the federal court proceeding due to the eleventh amend-
ment. It concluded that the suits were "qualitatively the same," and therefore there was no
injustice being worked on plaintiff by precluding the state action. Id. at 169. In Gagne v.
Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 453 A.2d 1162 (1983), plaintiffs, recipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) benefits, filed a federal class action seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief and retroactive benefits from the state agency. Simultaneously, an appeal
of the plaintiff's state fair hearing was pending in state court. The federal suit was settled
and a consent decree entered. No money damages had been awarded and there was no
reservation of that claim. Subsequently, the state court appeal was dismissed because the
consent decree was treated as res judicata. The state court relied on a state rule of claim
preclusion to the effect that a subsequent suit for money damages could not be maintained
following an action for injunctive relief on the same cause. Id. at 1164. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that there should be an exception to this state rule of preclusion because the federal
court was without jurisdiction to award the monetary relief requested due to the eleventh
amendment bar to such awards. Id. The court avoided the "interesting" content of plain-
tiff's argument by holding that even though the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the
claim for retroactive benefits, the parties were not prevented from settling all aspects of
the controversy raised by the pleading. Id. at 1165. For a case similar to the eleventh
amendment situation see, Varnal v. Kansas City, 481 S.W.2d 575 (Md. Ct. App. 1972). A
federal section 1983 suit was brought against the city housing department and certain mu-
nicipal officials. (The city itself was not amenable to suit under section 1983 prior to Mo-
nell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Following a federal
judgment for defendants, the plaintiffs filed state claims against the municipality in state
court. The court held that even though the municipality was immune from the federal suit,
it was in privity with the defendant officers in that suit. Because any subsequent suits
against those officials would be barred by claim preclusion the court held that the munici-
pality should also be free from further litigation to the same extent as the police officers.
Varnal, 481 S.W.2d at 579-80. Contra Boyne v. Harrison, 647 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983) (suit for money damages against state officials in their official capacities could
not have been joined with federal court action because of the eleventh amendment, there-
fore claim preclusion did not bar the litigation of that claim in state court); Toomey v.
Blum, 54 N.Y.2d 669, 426 N.E.2d 181, 442 N.Y.S.2d 774 (because the federal court was
without power to award retroactive benefits plaintiff requested in subsequent state court
litigation, there was no preclusion of that state court claim by the federal judgment).
226. Issue preclusion analysis is not usually affected by ihe fact that the state law claim
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eral and state claims, usual rules of issue preclusion would require
the state court to accept findings made in prior federal court pro-
ceedings.22 7 Therefore, if Pennhurst-type claims are bifurcated, as
was suggested by the Supreme Court, the state law claim often
cannot be considered de novo by the state court.
However, in the context of federal-state preclusion, when the
subsequent suit is against a state official, there may be a basis for
state court refusal to be bound by issue preclusion. The Pennhurst
II ruling that federal courts may not adjudicate such state law
claims was premised on notions of federalism and sovereign im-
munity. These are violated when a federal court orders state offi-
cials to comply with state law. In the majority's view, the eleventh
amendment stands for the proposition that state law claims against
a state and its officials can only be adjudicated by a state court.
This rationale appears to support an argument that neither claim
nor issue preclusion consequences of a federal proceeding should
be permitted to dictate the outcome of a state claim barred from
federal jurisdiction by Pennhurst 11.228 Otherwise, a federal court
would be able to do indirectly what it cannot do di-
rectly-adjudicate the merits of a state law claim against the state.
There do not appear to be any reported decisions which have
considered this line of reasoning for issue preclusion analysis in
federal-state litigation. There has been consideration of the analo-
could not have been heard in the prior federal action. The "could have been raised" stan-
dard is a limitation on the merger aspect of claim preclusion, which bars claims which were
not actually adjudicated. Since issue preclusion applies only to issues that were actually
litigated, actually determined and essential to the prior judgment, it is irrelevant whether
the subsequent claim could have been joined in the prior action.
227. Dean v. Children's Services Div. Juvenile Corrections Program, 57 Or. App. 521,
645 P.2d 581, 585 (1982); Rains v. State, 100 Wash.2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165, 169
(1983).
228. This is especially true where the federal court has found against the plaintiff and
for the state entity. The state or state officials not sued in federal court may nonetheless
raise the federal judgment under the doctrine of defensive use of collateral estoppel.
Where, however, the plaintiff prevailed in the federal action, some states have shown a
reluctance to apply issue preclusion against the state defendants. Sometimes preclusion is
denied by distinguishing the state court defendants from the federal defendants. The plain-
tiff's reasonable assertion of issue preclusion is denied by an artful determination that the
state defendants are not the same as, nor in privity with the federal defendants. See, e.g.,
Duvernay v. New York, 76 A.D.2d 962, 962, 429 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71, af'd 51 N.Y.2d 744,
411 N.E.2d 784, 432 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1980). Thus even where issue preclusion is "fully ap-
plicable" the subtle differences between offensive and defensive use, coupled with the fre-
quently fictitious distinctions between the state, state agency, state officials, etc. under the
eleventh amendment stacks the deck against the state plaintiff.
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gous issue in state-federal cases in which the second proceeding
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal court.229 The Su-
preme Court has sent mixed signals: at times indicating that find-
ings of fact should be given full effect, while rulings of law need
not be deferred to, and at other times appearing to question even
the binding nature of factual determinations. 230 A fair reading of
229. The most common outcome in state-federal exclusive jurisdiction cases has been
to deny claim preclusion as to a claim not raised in the prior proceeding (merger) but to
allow preclusion of claims (bar) and issues which were actually litigated and determined. In
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979), for example, a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding
sought to establish that the bankrupt's debt to him was not dischargeable under section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act because it was the product of fraud by the debtor. The bankrupt
countered that claim preclusion barred this assertion of fraud because of a prior collection
proceeding in state court that had given judgment on the debt to the creditor, without
allegations or findings of fraud. The bankrupt argued that the merger principle of claim
preclusion should bar the creditor from raising new matters that could have been litigated
in the state action.
The Supreme Court ruled that claim preclusion should not be applied because to give
finality to the state proceeding "would undercut Congress' intent to commit § 17 to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." Id. at 135. The Court concluded that one of the
purposes of the 1970 amendments to the Act was to "take these § 17 claims away from
state courts that seldom dealt with the federal bankruptcy laws and to give those claims to
the bankruptcy court so it could develop expertise in handling them." Id. at 136. At the
same time, the Court indicated in its opinion that had the fraud issue actually been liti-
gated in the prior proceeding, it might be given issue preclusion consequences "in the
absence of any countervailing statutory policy." Id. at 139 n.10.
230. Compare Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668, 674 (1978), where Jus-
tices Burger and Brennan, in separate dissents, expressed concern whether state court de-
termination of a claim over which the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction, should pre-
clude federal de novo review of purely legal questions in subsequent proceedings with
Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929). In Becher the Supreme Court
ruled that a party to a patent infringement proceeding in federal court could be estopped
by findings of fact made by a state court adjudicating a state law claim of breach of con-
tract and fiduciary duty. Id. at 391. Becher has been construed narrowly by lower federal
courts to apply to purely factual findings by state courts, thereby allowing litigation of
mixed questions of fact and law as well as federal legal issues in the federal proceeding. See,
e.g., Judge Learned Hand's influential opinion in Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 22 F.2d
184, 188 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). Becher has been ignored for the most
part by the Supreme Court; in a recent reference to the general issue of preclusion and
exclusive jurisdiction the case was not considered to be governing. See Will v. Calvert, 437
U.S. 655, where four of the Justices joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan and
identified as an open question whether it is "ever appropriate to accord res judicata effect
to a state-court determination of a claim over which the federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction." Id. at 674. Justice Burger, writing a separate dissent, shared this doubt, but de-
clined to address the issue. Id. at 668. Brennan reasoned that federal courts should always
be *able to consider purely legal questions de novo and even questioned the limited fact
finding preclusive effect that Becher upheld:
It is at least arguable that, in creating and defining a particular federal claim,
Congress assumed that the claim would be litigated only in the context of fed-
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the shifting precedent is that preclusion principles should be ap-
plied with full force except when they would substantially inter-
fere with the particular purposes of an exclusive jurisdiction stat-
ute. The fact that a matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
a federal court does not insulate it, per se, from preclusion conse-
quences of a prior state action. 31
The appropriate focus, therefore, in evaluating the applica-
tion of issue preclusion in federal-state litigation is whether, and
to what extent, such preclusion conflicts with the rationale for
placing such claims exclusively in state forums. The purposes be-
hind federal exclusive jurisdiction statutes are not directly analo-
gous; they are usually intended to develop uniform construction
of a federal statute, to place specialized cases before judges who
possess particular expertise, and to guarantee federal procedural
standards will be applied.23 2 The purposes articulated in Pennhurst
II may have a little to do with expertise and uniformity in inter-
pretation, but they are much more a reflection of the majority's
view of federalism. It is a value judgment, purportedly embodied
in the eleventh amendment, that it is inappropriate for federal
courts to decide state law claims and enter relief against a state.
State sovereignty and autonomy, the bases for giving exclusive ju-
risdiction over such claims to state courts, are clearly infringed if
federal courts are allowed to dictate the outcome of state proceed-
ings through application of claim and issue preclusion. It seems
that the rationale of the Pennhurst II decision provides even more
compelling support for an escape from preclusion than the pur-
poses of federal exclusive jurisdiction statutes.
Thus, when claims are split between federal and state courts
after Pennhurst II, and a federal judgment is entered first, existing
precedent would apply issue preclusion doctrine in its usual scope.
eral-court procedure-a fair assumption when the claim is within exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction. For example, Congress may have thought the liberal federal
discovery procedures crucial to the proper determination of the factual disputes
underlying the federal claim.
Id. at 675 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Neither the Burger nor Brennan opinions referred to Becher in discussing these "un-
resolved and difficult" issues, but Brennan cited lower court opinions, including Judge
Hand's decision in Lyons, to support de novo consideration of legal issues in claims under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id.
231. See Smith, supra note 196, at 96-98.
232. See generally, 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 4470 (1981); see also, Brown, 442 U.S. at 136 n.7.
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In most instances a finding by the federal court should be given
preclusive effect and will expedite the state proceeding by limiting
the issues in controversy. However, the same concerns for state
sovereignty, expressed by Justice Powell in Pennhurst II, give rise
to a strong argument that a state may deviate from issue preclu-
sion principles when application of issue preclusion would conflict
with the sovereignty interests of the state. In such instances, a
state court should be able to reconsider findings which would de-
termine the ultimate issues of the state court action.
In summary, the "bifurcation" of federal and state claims is
unlikely to result, as the Pennhurst 11 Court implied, in rulings on
the merits of each claim. Even if simultaneous suits are permitted
under the abstention doctrines, claim and issue preclusion in their
present form will effectively limit consideration to the first suit
which goes to judgment.
The net effect of Pennhurst 11, in light of these difficulties in
splitting claims, is to pressure litigants to bring both state and fed-
eral claims in a state court proceeding. As the next section dem-
onstrates however, even that strategy may not guarantee that both
claims will be adjudicated in a single proceeding. More impor-
tantly, this judicial channeling of litigants to state courts violates
congressional purposes in providing a federal forum for federal
claims.
B. State and Federal Claims in State Court
Normally, state and federal claims may be brought together
in a single state court proceeding. Although the Supreme Court
has never directly ruled that a state court must hear a section 1983
claim, it appears that state courts of general jurisdiction are not
barred from hearing the federal claim and further, are not free to
resist enforcement of section 1983 claims.233 A plaintiff's prefer-
233. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980) citing Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386, 391 (1947)); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980). In some states, how-
ever, it is not possible to litigate state and federal claims together because suits against the
sovereign must be brought in a special court of limited jurisdiction. In New York, for ex-
ample, damage actions against the state must be brought in the state court of claims; claims
f4r injunctive relief and suits against state officials for money damages cannot be brought
in the court of claims, but are properly filed in the county supreme courts, trial courts of
general jurisdiction. See supra note 188. This is not a problem in most states, which permit
tort claims against the state in the same court of general jurisdiciton which hears suits for
injunctive relief and for money damages against state officials. See, e.g., Massachusetts Tort
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ence for litigating state and federal claims together in state court
may be disturbed, however, by a defendant's attempt to remove
the suit to federal court.23 4 A defendant is permitted, under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a)23 5 to remove to federal district court a suit filed
in state court when the action falls within the original jurisdiction
of the federal court. A state law claim usually is not removable to
federal court,3 6 unless it is joined with a closely related federal
claim. When the federal claim is removed, the federal court will
usually exercise jurisdiction over the related state claim on the ba-
sis of pendent jurisdiction.237
However it is clear, after Pennhurst II, that a federal court
could not assume removal jurisdiction over state law claims seek-
ing relief against the state, absent waiver of the state's eleventh
amendment immunity. In such a removal situation, the federal
court has to choose between the defendant's right to have the fed-
Claims Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.258, § 1 (West 1959). See references in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1982). When related state and federal claims seek different
forms of relief against the state and its officials such exclusive jurisdiction provisions man-
date separate lawsuits. This results in duplicative litigation and the same claim and issue
preclusion problems as separate actions in state and federal court. See, e.g., Rooney v.
Tufano Contracting Corp., 43 Misc.2d 358, 251 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (judg-
ment of court of claims finding plaintiff was contributorily negligent may be used to bar
subsequent suit in New York Supreme Court by same plaintiff against another defendant).
234. The conventional wisdom has been that civil rights defendants, state and local
officials, and governmental entitites, prefer litigating in state court while plaintiffs will usu-
ally choose to litigate in federal court. This varies in some localities, however. For example,
plaintiffs in section 1983 actions in Boston, Massachusetts will sometimes file in state court
because the racial and socio-economic make-up of Suffolk County juries may be more desir-
able than federal court juries drawn from the larger metropolitan area. For this same rea-
son, the state defendants have attempted to remove such suits to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441.
235. Section 1441(a) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
236. A state law claim could be removed if the action falls within section 1332 juris-
diction-parties of diverse citizenship and a claim for more than $10,000-and the defen-
dant is not a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
237. See, e.g., Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc., 314 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1963);
Touragent Int'l, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
H.A. Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting & Portable Engineers Local No. 450, 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.
Tex. 1963); Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo.
1959).
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eral claim heard in federal court and the efficiency, economy and
convenience of hearing both claims together. There is no clear
precedent guiding federal courts in resolving this conflict.
The answer may lie in the fact that section 1441(a) provides
for the removal of a "civil action" from state to federal court, not
the removal of "claims." If the federal and state claims filed in
state court are considered to be a single "civil action," then after
Pennhurst II a court should conclude that such an action could not
have been brought in federal court. Subsection (c) of section
1441238 permits the removal of a "claim," as distinct from an "ac-
tion," when it is joined with an otherwise non-removable claim,
but only when it is "separate and independent" of the non-remov-
able claim. In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,239 the Supreme
Court ruled that factually related claims are not separate and in-
dependent claims for purposes of section 1441(c).240
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it leads to the
conclusion that a defendant's right to remove a federal question
claim is subject to relatively easy veto by the plaintiff: if the fed-
eral question claim is joined with a related, but non-removable
claim, such as a federal claim for money damages barred by
Edelman2" or a state claim for injunctive relief prohibited by Pen-
nhurst 11, the suit must remain in state court.
If, instead, removal is permitted for the federal question
claim alone, there will be not only the inconvenience and expense
of two separate suits and the possibility of a Colorado River stay,242
but also the claim and issue preclusion consequences discussed
earlier which may effectively preclude consideration of either the
state or federal claim.
243
Even if federal and state claims can be brought together in a
state court, the pressure to do so substantially interferes with a
238. Section 1441(c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-remov-
able claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district
court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
239. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
240. Id. at 14.
241. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 194-232.
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party's interest in having a federal court determine the federal
claim. Congress has established a scheme of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, giving litigants the opportunity to litigate claims that the
state and its officials are violating federal statutes and the federal
Constitution in a federal forum. The federal question and civil
rights jurisdictional statutes permit a plaintiff to file such claims in
the federal district courts and the removal statutes provide a de-
fendant with the option of transferring suits raising federal issues
from state to federal court.244 It was Congress' explicit determina-
tion that federal courts should be available to hear such federal
claims because state courts could not be relied upon to enforce
the Reconstruction era amendments and civil rights statutes.245
In the Supreme Court's recent comity-based decisions re-
stricting federal court jurisdiction, several Justices have ques-
tioned the continued validity of any distrust of state court adjudi-
cation in federal question suits. 246 The implicit premise in many of
these opinions urging deference to state court proceedings is that
state courts have proven themselves worthy of reassuming the in-
dependence and sovereignty which they enjoyed prior to the Civil
War. The fact remains, however, that Congress passed the Recon-
struction era statutes and expanded federal court jurisdiction for
the very purpose of altering the relationship between state and
federal courts. 247 The Supreme Court should not substitute its
244. The present versions of the removal statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1443
(1982). Portions of § 1441(a) and (c) appear supra notes 235 and 238. Section 1443
provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a
State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be incon-
sistent with such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982).
245. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374-76 (1871); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 24042 (1972).
246. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 435 (1979).
247. The Court, discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)), predecessor to sections 1983 and 1343(3) stated:
This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it
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view of appropriate federal-state relations in the 1980s for that
enacted into the jurisdictional statutes by Congress.
While concerns for comity, federalism and the burgeoning
federal caseload have animated Supreme Court decisions restrict-
ing access to federal courts, Congress has acted to increase, rather
than restrict, the role of federal courts in enforcing federal rights.
In 1980, for example, the federal question jurisdictional statute
was amended to delete the amount-in-controversy requirement. 248
In addition, Congress has steadily increased the number of federal
judges to meet the caseload demands.4 9
In two recent decisions, a majority of the Court has properly
rejected invitations to impose judicially created restrictions on the
scheme of jurisdiction and remedies established by Congress. In
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 250 the Court relied on the legislative his-
tory of section 1983 for its conclusion that the statute should be
an exception to the usual, judicially-created doctrine requiring ex-
haustion of administrative remedies. Seven of the Justices recog-
nized that, even though comity considerations weighed in favor of
requiring resort to state administrative remedies, it was Congress'
and not the Court's role to establish such a barrier to the section
1983 litigant's access to federal court."' Pulliam v. Allen252 re-
jected an assertion of absolute immunity by a state court judge
and found that she was subject to injunctive relief and an award of
attorneys' fees in a section 1983 action. The majority acknowl-
edged that "[i]t no longer is proper to assume that a state court
will not act to prevent a federal constitutional deprivation. '258
Nevertheless, they concluded that the Court could not immunize
was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to
the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instru-
mentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in
fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these
failings extended to the state courts.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242.
248. Pub. L. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 133 has been amended to increase the number of federal district
court judges. The latest amendment occurred January 14, 1983, Pub. L. 97-471, § 2(A). 96
Stat. 2601 (1983).
250. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
251. Id. at 502-07; see also id. at 516-17 (O'Connor & Rehnquist, J.J., concurring); id.
at 517-19 (White, J., concurring).
252. 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
253. Id. at 1981.
292 [Vol. 34
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ERIE
state judges when the clear intent of Congress was to subject
judges to suits for injunctive relief and to awards of attorneys'
fees.
25 4
There is good reason for maintaining federal courts as viable
alternatives to state court systems, given the nature of many fed-
eral question suits, such as section 1983 actions against state offi-
cials for violation of federal rights. Such claims call upon a judge
to assess state statutes or decisions made by state officials against
the standards set by the federal Constitution. Even without the
history of lawlessness in the post-Civil War South, it is understand-
able that Congress would permit litigants to seek relief in federal
courts, whose judges are more likely to be insulated from political
pressures and loyalties to the state officials being sued.255
The Pennhurst II decision does not directly deny access to fed-
eral court on a federal claim. In barring the pendent state law
claim, it left intact federal jurisdiction for prospective relief
against state officials under federal statutes or the Constitution.2 58
However, the practical effect of Pennhurst II, in conjunction with
the preclusion doctrines discussed earlier, is to permit access to
federal court on the federal claim only at the cost of dropping
related state law claims. If the state claim is brought along with
the federal claim, in federal court, it will be dismissed under Pen-
nhurst II; if it is brought separately in state court it may trigger
Colorado River abstention or claim preclusion of the federal claim.
Thus, the only way in which a litigant can be guaranteed a deci-
sion on the merits of the federal claim by a federal court is to
forego litigation of the state claim.
In many instances this is a significant price to pay for access to
a federal forum. State constitutions and state civil rights statutes
often provide protections of individual liberties comparable to
federal law.257 A litigant with a substantial state law claim against
254. Id.
255. See, Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). PROFESSOR
NEUBORNE CATALOGUES NUMEROUS DIFFERENCES IN THE BACKGROUND, SELECTION PROCESS, TEN-
URE AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES WHICH CALL INTO QUESTION THE
SUPREME COURT'S PLATITUDES REGARDING THE PARITY OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURT ADJUDI-
CATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTION RIGHTS.
256. The Pennhurst II decision does not alter the Ex parte Young rule allowing claims
for prospective injunctive relief against state officials on federal law grounds. See supra text
accompanying notes 138-42.
257. Indeed, in a few instances state law may provide greater protection than federal
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state officials would be under great pressure to litigate the federal
claim in state rather than federal court in order to preserve both
claims.
This forced trade-off between gaining access to federal court
and pursuing a state law claim is the result of an unwise policy
decision by the Pennhurst II majority. Justice Powell contended
that "considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional
limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate
suits against a State.1258 However, as has been shown, the Pen-
nhurst II ruling was not compelled by the language, history or
prior construction of the eleventh amendment. The Pennhurst II
decision is a misguided imposition of the majority's view of fed-
eral-state relations, clashing with Congressional purposes in estab-
lishing federal question and civil rights jurisdiction, and unneces-
sarily undermining the rationale and practical benefits of pendent
jurisdiction doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Tension often exists between the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion and the notions of state sovereignty which underlie our fed-
eral system. When a federal court awards extensive relief against
state officials on the basis of state law, the friction is particularly
acute. In Pennhurst II, the Supreme Court chose to resolve this
tension by establishing an absolute, jurisdictional barrier to all
pendent claims against state officials.
This Article has sought to demonstrate that the Pennhurst II
decision is unjustified, unnecessary and unwise. The majority at-
tempted to justify its result as one mandated by the eleventh
amendment. In fact, Pennhurst II created a novel application of
the amendment which goes beyond its language, history and prior
construction. In extending the amendment to bar all pendent
state law claims, the Court repudiated the analysis for applying
law. This is true, for example, in those states which have ratified the equal rights amend-
ment as part of the state constitution. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has
construed that provision in its Declaration of Rights to be "more stringent than the Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection requirements." Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663,
405 N.E.2d 135 (1980). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); NOTE, The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982).
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the amendment to pendent claims which it, and the lower federal
courts, had employed for seventy-five years.
The Pennhurst II approach is unnecessary because existing
doctrines already adequately safeguard state sovereignty. Pendent
jurisdiction is a discretionary exercise of jurisdiction which consid-
ers, along with efficiency, convenience and fairness, the intrusion
into state sovereignty which might result. Furthermore, under
Erie principles, when pendent jurisdiction is exercised, the immu-
nities and defenses provided by tate law will govern. This means
that a federal court would apply the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity as it has evolved in the particular state. It thus adequately
protects the state's sovereignty by letting state statutes and court
decisions determine the scope of immunity.
Finally, the Pennhurst II ruling is unwise because it further
complicates jurisdictional doctrines in federal court. It also has the
effect of diverting federal claims away from the federal courts,
contrary to Congressional purposes in establishing a federal forum
for federal question and civil rights litigation.
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